Does the provision of information on outcomes of local governments improve political accountability?

How to cite

Garcia, Maximiliano; Gallego, Francisco; Eyzaguirre, Sylvia; Cox, Loreto. 2016. "Does the provision of information on outcomes of local governments improve political accountability?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001695. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1695-2.0

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Maximiliano Garcia* , Francisco Gallego , Sylvia Eyzaguirre , Loreto Cox

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001695
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1695-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-10-12 – 2017-02-01
Countries
Chile ()
JEL codes
H400
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1695

Abstract

Does the provision of information on outcomes of local governments improve political accountability? In this project we study, first, whether the provision of information on the performance of local public schools by incumbent politicians affects political outcomes (i.e. turnout and vote for the incumbent) and, second, whether there are heterogeneous by different ways of providing information, i. e. with different benchmarks.

We test this in the context of Chile, where (i) the provision of public education depends on locally elected governments and (ii) there are reliable data on educational outcomes. The experiment consists in sending an information letter to voters in randomly selected voting booths one week before local elections, to be held in October 23, 2016. The letters contain information on past performance of incumbent mayors on education (correcting for differences in socioeconomic status and resources across different municipalities), in both levels and changes. Furthermore, we will also assess the effects of two different yardsticks: in one group of letters we stress the average educational performance of municipalities and in the other, the performance of the top municipality. With this, we expect to provide insights on how citizens assess information when they have different benchmarks at hand, and on how they trade-off information on performance in levels and changes.

Intervention

Delivery of information related to mayor's performance to voters before election.

Experimental design

Random selection of voting booths within each county.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Voting Booths: we treat (i.e. send a letter) to each voter registered in selected voting booths. But data is grouped at voting booth level.
Clusters
400
Observations
22,938 voting booths
Arms
200 for each treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
Turnout Outcomes: Turnout: percentage of registered citizen in booth that actually turn out. Women's/Men's turnout: percentage of women/men in booth that actually turned out. Turnout by age groups: percentage of people turning out in booth by age range (in 5 year ranges). Results of the mayor's election Incumbent's vote share: percentage of votes for the incumbent over total votes. Main challenger's vote share: percentage of votes for the most competitive challenger over total votes. Invalid votes: percentage of invalid votes over total votes. Competitiveness of election: difference between the percentage of votes of the most voted and the second most voted candidate for mayor. Results of the municipal council's election Vote share of the incumbent mayor's coalition. Vote share of the Nueva Mayoría (government and center left political coalition) Vote share of Chile Vamos (center right political coalition) (main opposition) coalition. Vote share of the two main historical coalitions (Nueva Mayoría and Chile Vamos). Vote share of independent candidates (regardless of whether they belong to a coalition). Vote share of independent candidates with no coalition. Difference in the vote shares of Nueva Mayoria and Chile Vamos, Difference in the vote shares of most voted and second most voted coalitions.

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Keywords