Group Identity and Dynamic Principal-Agent Problem: Theory and Experimental Evidence

How to cite

Lin, ChienHsun; Chen, Chun-Ting. 2025. "Group Identity and Dynamic Principal-Agent Problem: Theory and Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016938. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16938-1.0

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ChienHsun Lin* , Chun-Ting Chen

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016938
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16938-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2025-10-01 – 2025-10-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C70, C92
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16938

Abstract

We investigate the impact of group identity on the labor market using a lab experiment. Our experimental design is structured as a group classification procedure followed by a matching protocol that pairs employers and employees, who are played by subjects. We select a standard theoretical framework that incorporates group identity and analyze its properties to derive testable implications and to elicit subjects' strategic behavior during the game.

Intervention

We vary the other players that the subjects will interact in the experiment.

Experimental design

The experiment would undergo a group classification procedure followed by a matching protocol that mimics the employer-employee matching process in the labor market. Subjects are to play a canonical principal-agent game where a part of the subjects act as principals (employers) and the other part as agents (employees). The principals design the contracts, and agents decide whether to accept and the corresponding actions.

Design details

Randomization method
Done by computer random draw before each group of sessions start. In consecutive sessions, if the first is assigned as the same-group, then the other is a different-group, and vice versa. An unknown group will be followed with a pair of same and different group treatments to ensure the subjects in the same/different treatments are adequate.
Randomization unit
Experimental sessions
Clusters
15 experimental sessions
Observations
300 subjects
Arms
100 per each arm of same-group/different-group/unknown-group treatments.
Primary outcomes
Principals: wage offers, beliefs of agents' actions Agents: decisions on offers (reject decision and effort level decision) All subjects: risk attitude, contributions in the dictator game
Secondary outcomes
Time spent on each page, responses in chatbox or surveys.

Cited by

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Keywords