Public Disclosure and Corporate Tax Compliance in Brazil

How to cite

Rodrigues, Natalia. 2025. "Public Disclosure and Corporate Tax Compliance in Brazil." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016909. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16909-1.0

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Natalia Rodrigues*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016909
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16909-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-11-03 – 2026-04-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16909

Abstract

Several measures have been used by tax authorities to increase tax compliance, such as prosecutions, audits and shaming. Yet most studies about shaming find ambiguous results and take place in developed countries. Considering that the relationship between social norms and tax compliance is different in developing countries, I aim to investigate what type of messages help increase voluntary tax compliance in Brazil. The research design consists of a RCT to test if the collection of tax debts is affected by public disclosure of delinquent taxpayers (non-pecuniary measure) and asset expropriation (pecuniary measure), and how firm behavior differs between firms with different sizes (large x small) and performances (high x low). I will randomly send letters to delinquent firms and then measure the effect on subsequent payment rates.

Experimental design

The research design consists of a RCT to test if the collection of tax debts is affected by information about delinquent taxpayers (shaming) and government spending (fiscal exchange). I will randomly send letters to delinquent firms and then measure the effect of information on subsequent payment or negotiation rates. The treatment arms are: letter with threat of public disclosure (non-pecuniary measure) and letter with threat of asset expropriation (pecuniary measure). One control group will not receive any letter and the other control group will receive a simple reminder letter.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer
Randomization unit
Firms
Clusters
4 clusters: large x small firms; high x low performing firms
Observations
50,000 firms
Arms
The sample consists of 50,000 firms divided into four treatment arms. 5,000 firms will receive no letter (control group), 5,000 will receive a simple reminder letter, 20,000 will receive an asset expropriation letter, and 20,000 will receive a public disclosure letter. For the asset expropriation and public disclosure arms, firms are further divided into four clusters based on a 2x2 design: firm size (large vs. small) and performance (high vs. low).
Primary outcomes
Payment or negotiation of outstanding tax debts

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords