Dynamic Network Formation and Coalition Building through Real-Time Communication

How to cite

Xiaotian, Deng; Li, Chenyang. 2025. "Dynamic Network Formation and Coalition Building through Real-Time Communication." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016865. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16865-1.0

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Deng Xiaotian* , Chenyang Li

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016865
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16865-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-10-30 – 2026-01-30
Countries
China (Guangdong)
JEL codes
C92, D85, C71, D91, D23
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16865

Abstract

This study investigates how individuals form coalitions and make strategic decisions in network-based economic environments through a novel experimental design that combines real-time communication with endogenous network formation. Participants engage in a multi-round experimental game where they can communicate freely through instant messaging and strategically self-select their network connections while competing in performance-based tasks.

The experiment examines how different network structures, economic incentives, and communication opportunities influence coalition formation, strategic communication patterns, and individual decision-making processes across multiple rounds of interaction. By allowing participants to endogenously form their social networks through friend requests and maintain real-time conversations, this research provides unique insights into the organic development of strategic alliances in competitive economic environments.

The study addresses fundamental questions about social network effects on economic behavior, including how network topology affects cooperation and competition, how real-time communication influences trust and coordination, and how individuals navigate the tension between individual performance and collective action. The experimental design offers methodological innovations by integrating dynamic network formation with strategic communication in a controlled laboratory setting.

The findings will contribute to our understanding of social network effects on economic behavior, strategic interaction in multi-agent systems, and the role of communication in facilitating or hindering cooperative behavior. Results may have broader implications for organizational design, team formation, and policy interventions in networked environments where individuals must balance competitive and cooperative incentives.

Intervention

Participants engage in a multi-round network-based economic game involving task performance and strategic communication. The intervention manipulates network structure (allowing participants to form connections endogenously) and communication opportunities (real-time messaging capabilities) while participants compete in performance-based activities. Different experimental conditions vary the network formation rules and incentive structures to examine how these factors influence coalition formation and strategic behavior. Each session consists of multiple rounds where participants make individual performance decisions while having opportunities for communication and network formation with other participants.

Experimental design

This study employs a randomized controlled laboratory experiment using a between-subjects design with multiple treatment conditions. Participants are randomly assigned to groups and engage in a multi-round network-based economic game. The experimental design systematically varies network structure constraints and economic incentive parameters to examine their effects on coalition formation and strategic communication.

The experiment uses a factorial design manipulating: (1) network formation rules that determine how participants can connect with each other, and (2) threshold parameters that affect coalition success requirements. Each experimental session involves multiple rounds of interaction where participants complete individual performance tasks while having opportunities for strategic communication and network formation.

Randomization occurs at both the session level (treatment assignment) and within-session level (certain game parameters). The design controls for potential confounds through standardized instructions, identical task structures across conditions, and balanced treatment allocation. Sessions are conducted in a controlled laboratory environment with computer-mediated interaction to ensure treatment fidelity and data quality.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer-based randomization using pseudo-random number generator in controlled laboratory setting
Randomization unit
Two-level randomization: 1. Session-level randomization: Experimental sessions (groups of 7 participants) are randomly assigned to treatment conditions (network structure × coalition threshold combinations) 2. Individual-level randomization: Within sessions, participants are randomly assigned to initial network positions (where applicable) and certain game parameters such as task presentation order and coalition opportunity sequences are randomized
Clusters
86-100 experimental sessions
Observations
600-700 participants
Arms
Network Structure Treatment Arms: - Star Network: 29-34 sessions (203-238 participants) - Ring Network: 29-33 sessions (203-231 participants) - Full Network: 28-33 sessions (196-231 participants) Within each network structure, sessions are further allocated across 5 coalition threshold conditions (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 participants) with approximately 6-7 sessions per threshold level. Additional star network bonus conditions: 10-15 sessions allocated to star network with center node dividend distribution.
Primary outcomes
1. Coalition Formation Rate: Proportion of successful coalitions formed across different network structures and threshold conditions 2. Network Connection Choices: Pattern of endogenous network formation including frequency and targeting of friend requests 3. Strategic Communication Behavior: Volume, timing, and content patterns of real-time messaging between participants 4. Reporting Decisions: Individual choices to report or participate in coalition activities under different incentive structures 5. Individual Task Performance: Accuracy and completion rates in cognitive tasks across different social and network contexts 6. Earnings Distribution: Total points/payoffs earned by participants across individual performance, coalition participation, and strategic decision components
Secondary outcomes
1. Learning Effects: Changes in task performance and strategic behavior across experimental rounds 2. Trust and Reciprocity Measures: Patterns of mutual friend acceptance, message reciprocity, and cooperative behavior sustainability 3. Network Centrality Effects: Relationship between participants' network positions and their behavioral outcomes 4. Communication Content Analysis: Qualitative categorization of message types (coordination, deception, information sharing, negotiation) 5. Decision Timing Patterns: Response latencies in task completion, coalition decisions, and communication initiation 6. Risk Preferences Revelation: Behavioral indicators of risk attitudes through coalition participation decisions under uncertainty 7. Social Preference Indicators: Evidence of altruistic, competitive, or reciprocal motivations in strategic choices 8. Adaptation Strategies: Changes in network formation and communication strategies in response to previous round outcomes

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Keywords