Cognitive Ability, Rationality and Cooperation in Repeated Games

How to cite

Sgroi, Daniel; Kelishomi, Ali Moghaddasi; Sofianos, Andis. 2025. "Cognitive Ability, Rationality and Cooperation in Repeated Games." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016845. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16845-1.1

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Daniel Sgroi* , Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi , Andis Sofianos

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016845
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16845-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2025-10-02 – 2026-01-31
Countries
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16845

Abstract

This study aims to understand the extent to which people’s quality of decision making and their ability to engage in strategic interaction are related to cooperation in repeated games. Existing research indicates that the quality of decision-making, alongside cognitive ability, significantly influences crucial real-world outcomes, including wealth accumulation. While there is a growing literature on the influence of cognitive ability on strategic behaviour and cooperation in repeated games (including work by collaborators in this project) there is a notable research gap regarding the impact of decision-making quality on cooperation. We use adherence to GARP (the generalized axiom of revealed preference) as our benchmark of decision-making quality.

Intervention

The primary outcome of interest is the cooperation rate in an induced infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game.

Experimental design

Our experimental design comprises a two-part experiment conducted within the same session in a physical laboratory. In the first part, we use a task designed to measure adherence to the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) which we use to group individuals into different experimental arms each of which corresponds to a different level of adherence to GARP. We then randomly match individuals within each arm to play a repeated prisoner's dilemma.

Design details

Randomization method
O-Tree randomly matches players to play the repeated prisoner’s dilemma within each group.
Randomization unit
Randomized at the individual level.
Clusters
256 individuals.
Observations
256 individuals (each will play the stage game up to 92 times).
Arms
256 individuals split into 4 groups using F-GARP scores, so 64 per arm.
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome is the cooperation rate compared across different groups
Secondary outcomes
We are also interested in describing the dynamics associated with the cooperation rate though there is no specific hypothesis attached to this.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords