How does providing labour-market information to employers at the job-posting stage change job postings and hiring outcomes? Experimental evidence from French employers.
How to cite
Gilbert, Mattis; Rathelot, Roland; Butschek, Sebastian; Steinmayr, Andreas; Schwab, Marina. 2025. "How does providing labour-market information to employers at the job-posting stage change job postings and hiring outcomes? Experimental evidence from French employers.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016840. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16840-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Many firms report difficulties in filling vacancies. This project investigates whether this may be due to posted wages being too low relative to what the supply side expects, and whether recruiters are misinformed about the prevailing wage distribution. In collaboration with a major French job board, we evaluate the results of a randomised experiment that provides recruiters with information on local labour market wages at the job-posting stage. The intervention relies on an interactive tool, developed by the job board, which displays a vacancy’s posted wage position within the distribution of posted wages in the same local labour market. The results of this experiment will shed light on the extent to which recruiter misinformation about the wage distribution distorts both vacancy postings and the job-matching process.
Intervention
A major job board has created a software application to inform employers about the distribution of wages posted by other employers within the same local labour market. This application takes the form of a visually appealing widget that displays information based on a call to a specific API. The information underlying the widget is computed at the local labour market level.
Experimental design
We will conduct a clustered randomised trial. Employers are the randomisation clusters. Job ads are the observation units.
Treated employers will be shown information about the distribution of posted wage, while control employers will not.
Design details
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