How does providing labour-market information to employers at the job-posting stage change job postings and hiring outcomes? Experimental evidence from French employers.

How to cite

Gilbert, Mattis; Rathelot, Roland; Butschek, Sebastian; Steinmayr, Andreas; Schwab, Marina. 2025. "How does providing labour-market information to employers at the job-posting stage change job postings and hiring outcomes? Experimental evidence from French employers.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016840. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16840-2.0

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Mattis Gilbert* , Roland Rathelot , Sebastian Butschek , Andreas Steinmayr , Marina Schwab

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016840
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16840-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-09-25 – 2026-03-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
J31, J63, J64, C93, D83, J68
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16840

Abstract

Many firms report difficulties in filling vacancies. This project investigates whether this may be due to posted wages being too low relative to what the supply side expects, and whether recruiters are misinformed about the prevailing wage distribution. In collaboration with a major French job board, we evaluate the results of a randomised experiment that provides recruiters with information on local labour market wages at the job-posting stage. The intervention relies on an interactive tool, developed by the job board, which displays a vacancy’s posted wage position within the distribution of posted wages in the same local labour market. The results of this experiment will shed light on the extent to which recruiter misinformation about the wage distribution distorts both vacancy postings and the job-matching process.

Intervention

A major job board has created a software application to inform employers about the distribution of wages posted by other employers within the same local labour market. This application takes the form of a visually appealing widget that displays information based on a call to a specific API. The information underlying the widget is computed at the local labour market level.

Experimental design

We will conduct a clustered randomised trial. Employers are the randomisation clusters. Job ads are the observation units.
Treated employers will be shown information about the distribution of posted wage, while control employers will not.

Design details

Randomization method
The pseudo-randomization is performed using a modulo 3 of the hashed recruiter account ID.
Randomization unit
Randomization is at the recruiter account level.
Clusters
47,000 employers.
Observations
180,000 job ads.
Arms
15,667 control employers, 31,333 treated employers.
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcomes are: - the (lower-bound) posted wage is non-missing (dummy), - value of the (lower-bound) posted wage (in logs), - absolute deviation of the (lower-bound) posted wage from the market-specific median wage, - the vacancy has been filled (dummy).
Secondary outcomes
• Characteristics of job ads: – Dummy variable: completion of the job ad posting process – Dummy variable: the posted wage first entered was changed during the ad posting process – Experience required in the job – Contract duration/type • Application pool: – Number of applications – Number of clicks overall – Applicant quality (as defined below) – Number of clicks by unemployed vs. not unemployed users (data quality yet to be ascertained - we will remove this outcome if necessary) • Hiring outcomes: – Time required to hire. – Realised wages (if successful hiring). – Quality of hired candidate (if successful hiring). – Job duration. • Future postings: – Number of job postings in the same occupation over the next 3/6/9/12 months

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Keywords