Fixed-Equity Auctions with Common Values
How to cite
Breig, Zachary; Hernandez-Chanto, Allan; Carrasco, Diego. 2025. "Fixed-Equity Auctions with Common Values." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016839. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16839-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study investigates behavior in first-price common-value auctions with fixed-equity contracts. Subjects will participate in laboratory sessions in groups of three, completing 30 rounds of the “wallet game” in which each bidder receives an independent private signal and the project value equals the sum of signals. Within each round, the seller requires the winner to pay both their cash bid and an equity share of the realized value, with the equity rate randomized across 0%, 20%, 40%, and 60%. In addition, a between-subject treatment varies how point earnings are converted to cash: in the baseline, conversion is linear, while in the treatment it becomes concave, thereby inducing effective risk aversion.
Experimental design
Subjects will participate in a lab experiment using common-value auctions.
Design details
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