Fixed-Equity Auctions with Common Values

How to cite

Breig, Zachary; Hernandez-Chanto, Allan; Carrasco, Diego. 2025. "Fixed-Equity Auctions with Common Values." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016839. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16839-1.1

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Zachary Breig* , Allan Hernandez-Chanto , Diego Carrasco

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016839
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16839-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2025-09-24 – 2025-10-31
Countries
Australia ()
JEL codes
C70, C90, D44, D47
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16839

Abstract

This study investigates behavior in first-price common-value auctions with fixed-equity contracts. Subjects will participate in laboratory sessions in groups of three, completing 30 rounds of the “wallet game” in which each bidder receives an independent private signal and the project value equals the sum of signals. Within each round, the seller requires the winner to pay both their cash bid and an equity share of the realized value, with the equity rate randomized across 0%, 20%, 40%, and 60%. In addition, a between-subject treatment varies how point earnings are converted to cash: in the baseline, conversion is linear, while in the treatment it becomes concave, thereby inducing effective risk aversion.

Experimental design

Subjects will participate in a lab experiment using common-value auctions.

Design details

Randomization method
The experimental software will randomize automatically. Groups, signals, and fixed-equity rates are re-randomized each round.
Randomization unit
Randomization will occur in each round.
Clusters
Our final sample size is expected to be 150-170 subjects.
Observations
With 160 subjects participating in 30 rounds, the total number of observations is expected to be 4800.
Arms
We expect to have 80 subjects in the two between-treatments.
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome variables will be bids and auction revenue.
Secondary outcomes
N/A

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords