Digital Technology, Meritocracy and Rent-seeking, Experiment in China

How to cite

Chen, Junkai. 2025. "Digital Technology, Meritocracy and Rent-seeking, Experiment in China." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016833. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16833-1.0

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Junkai Chen*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016833
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16833-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2023-09-01 – 2025-09-20
Countries
China ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16833

Abstract

The advancement of digital technology enables governments to access vast amounts of data, raising concerns about centralization and privacy infringement. However, many local governments actively pursue digital governance initiatives, prompting a key question: What motivates local officials? One explanation is that digital technology creates rent-seeking opportunities. This paper conducts a randomized experiment involving more than 2,000 Chinese civil servants, introducing two information interventions: merit intervention and low-pay intervention. Participants choose between automated and manually managed projects. We find that when officials receive both merit-intervention and low-pay intervention, they exhibit a stronger preference for retaining human discretion in digital governance, favoring automated technologies over manually managed projects. Using a list experiment, we show that officials recognize the rent-seeking opportunities embedded in automated governance and, after treatment, display greater tolerance for corruption. We attribute this to the sharp contrast between the intense competition for public office and the relatively low salaries. We also rule out alternative explanations, including technocratic enthusiasm, distrust in technology, power-seeking motives, and prosocial behavior. Our findings provide new insights into the political economy of digital governance by shedding light on the motivations driving government officials to adopt digital technologies.

Experimental design

We conducted a randomized trial on over 2000 Chinese civil servants, which included two types of information interventions - merit intervention and low-pay intervention. During the merit intervention stage, we randomly informed some respondents of the competition ratio for this year's civil service exam - the competition ratio for popular positions is above 1000:1, in order to stimulate their sense of elite as winners of the civil service exam. During the low-pay intervention phase, we randomly told some respondents about the news of civil service pay cuts and asked them to recall whether they had experienced pay cuts. After each information intervention, we also raised a series of questions to test the effectiveness of the information intervention.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
2000 individuals
Observations
3000
Arms
1000 individuals each group
Primary outcomes
The advancement of digital technology enables governments to access vast amounts of data, raising concerns about centralization and privacy infringement. However, many local governments actively pursue digital governance initiatives, prompting a key question: What motivates local officials? One explanation is that digital technology creates rent-seeking opportunities. This paper conducts a randomized experiment involving more than 2,000 Chinese civil servants, introducing two information interventions: merit intervention and low-pay intervention. Participants choose between automated and manually managed projects. We find that when officials receive both merit-intervention and low-pay intervention, they exhibit a stronger preference for retaining human discretion in digital governance, favoring automated technologies over manually managed projects. Using a list experiment, we show that officials recognize the rent-seeking opportunities embedded in automated governance and, after treatment, display greater tolerance for corruption. We attribute this to the sharp contrast between the intense competition for public office and the relatively low salaries. We also rule out alternative explanations, including technocratic enthusiasm, distrust in technology, power-seeking motives, and prosocial behavior. Our findings provide new insights into the political economy of digital governance by shedding light on the motivations driving government officials to adopt digital technologies.

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Keywords