Advance Payments and Seasonal Migration

How to cite

Bishop, Menna. 2025. "Advance Payments and Seasonal Migration." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016828. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16828-1.0

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Menna Bishop*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016828
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16828-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2025-09-14 – 2026-06-01
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16828

Abstract

This project studies the demand-side of labour contracts offering payment in advance for seasonal migrant workers. This will be achieved through an experiment in partnership with real firms in India's brick kiln industry, who pay workers a large share of their earnings upon recruitment, prior to the start of the work period. We will advertise vacancies at kilns randomly chosen contracts and collect an incentivised measure of workers' interest in applying. Whilst some workers will be advertised the status quo high advance offer, others will be advertised a contract offering a lower advance but higher piece rate at the kiln. This design will allow us to causally identify the effect of advance payments on worker interest in the vacancy. Advances provide households with a borrowing opportunity with no spending conditions attached, and we will explore whether this makes advances particularly attractive to credit constrained households and those subject to negative economic shocks. These mechanisms will be tested against other potential drivers of demand for advances, including present bias.

Intervention

This study experimentally varies the contractual terms of job offers for seasonal migrant work in India's brick kiln industry. We will advertise real vacancies at partner brick kilns to households in rural Odisha. A key feature of these jobs is the "advance," a large share of a worker's earnings paid upfront before the work period begins. The intervention will randomly assign households to receive one of three types of contract offers:
1. A "High Advance" contract, reflecting the status quo in the industry.
2. A "Low Advance" contract, which offers a smaller upfront payment but compensates workers with a higher piece rate during the work season.
3. A "Choice" contract, where workers are presented with both a high advance/low piece rate option and a low advance/higher piece rate option and asked to choose their preferred contract.
The objective is to measure how the structure of payment, specifically the size of the advance, affects workers' interest in applying for these jobs.

Experimental design

The study uses a three-arm randomized controlled trial to test how advance payments affect job take-up. Households in 68 villages in Odisha, India, will be surveyed. In 50 of these villages, households will be randomly assigned to receive one of two job offers: a "High Advance" offer or a "Low Advance" offer. In the remaining 18 villages, all surveyed households will be assigned to a "Choice" arm, where they can choose between a high-advance and a low-advance contract. The primary analysis will compare application rates between the High and Low Advance arms. The Choice arm will be used to analyse preference reversals.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization will be performed by a computer using a pre-generated random assignment list.
Randomization unit
There are two levels of randomization: 1. Village-level: 18 villages are randomly assigned to the "Choice" treatment arm. 2. Household-level: Within the other 50 villages, households are randomly assigned to either the "High Advance" or "Low Advance" treatment arm.
Clusters
68 villages
Observations
1360 households
Arms
High advance: 500 households (in 50 villages) Low advance: 500 households (in 50 villages) Choice: 360 households (in 18 villages)
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcomes are two incentivised measures of worker interest in the advertised job vacancy: Expressed interest: A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent asks to be added to the list of applicants for the job. Successful registration: A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent is interested and successfully completes the full registration procedure.
Secondary outcomes
Our main secondary outcome tests for time-inconsistent preferences: Preference Reversal to High Advance: A binary indicator for households in the "Choice" arm who initially do not select the high advance contract but switch their preference to the high advance contract when asked again closer to the payment date.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords