Improving state effectiveness in environmental risk mitigation: Experimental evidence from Bangladesh

How to cite

Best, Michael; Willis, Jack; Barnwal, Prabhat; Habib, Md. Ahasan; Geen, Alexander Van; Kim, Seung Min. 2025. "Improving state effectiveness in environmental risk mitigation: Experimental evidence from Bangladesh." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016814. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16814-2.2

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Michael Best* , Jack Willis , Prabhat Barnwal , Md. Ahasan Habib , Alexander Van Geen , Seung Min Kim

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016814
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16814-2.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2026-07-21 – 2026-12-31
Countries
Bangladesh ()
JEL codes
H23; H41; Q25; Q53; Q56
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16814

Abstract

This study tests whether providing local government officials with better information and non-financial recognition can improve the allocation of public drinking water wells in rural Bangladesh. Naturally occurring arsenic in groundwater affects tens of millions of people in Bangladesh and poses major health and economic risks. Each year, the government installs a limited number of deep wells to provide arsenic-safe water, but these wells are not always placed where they would benefit the most people.

In this randomized controlled trial, 200 Union Chairpersons, who dictate the allocation of governmental wells within their jurisdiction, are cross-randomized into either receiving an access to a web-based planning tool and/or receiving an incentive to prioritize high-arsenic regions within their unions. The tool shows arsenic contamination levels across villages and allows UNOs to simulate the public health impact of different well allocations. The incentive provides non-pecuniary benefits (bonus wells) when the union chairperson prioritizes high-arsenic regions.

The main outcome is how efficiently the union chairperson allocate wells, measured by how many arsenic-exposed households benefit from their allocations relative to the maximum possible impact given their budget. This study aims to explore the frictions of achieving optimal allocation of governmental resources in low-resource settings.

Intervention

In Bangladesh, the DPHE (Department of Public Health Engineering) is the governmental body in charge of allocating and installing arsenic-safe public wells. Each fiscal year, villagers submit applications to the local DPHE office asking for the installation of DPHE wells in their neighborhood. The DPHE budget for public wells is shared across unions (administrative unit of 13 villages on average). Since applications often exceed the available slots, the Union Parishad chairperson (henceforth "union leader") has to make decisions on allocating wells. The decision making process directly involves the DPHE upazila-level DPHE engineer, who advises the union leaders and oversees the logistics of installing and maintaining the DPHE wells.

Despite their important role in providing arsenic-safe water, DPHE wells have been subject to suboptimal allocation–due to the lack of local knowledge on arsenic contamination status and political pressure. Further, while a large-scale, DPHE-led field testing campaign involving testing of 6.3 million wells allows a detailed understanding of within-union arsenic contamination levels, an evaluation of upazila-level engineers’ understanding of village-level contamination revealed large gaps between the DPHE engineers’ understanding of village-level arsenic contamination and the actual arsenic contamination in these villages.

This strongly suggests that two factors pose important barriers to optimal DPHE well installation that would maximize its public health benefits: first, the information gap between expected arsenic severity and the actual arsenic severity among the responsible agents (union leaders and engineers), and second, whether availability of correct information to responsible agents will lead to actual application in DPHE well allocation.

The intervention aims to study above barriers using a field experiment where we cross-randomize an “information” and an “incentives” treatment. The information intervention provides Union Parishad leaders with a trained-access dashboard displaying sub-union arsenic data, digitizing well applications, and simulating the health benefits of alternative allocations. In the incentive intervention, leaders rank four preferred wells and are randomized to either a bonus-well tournament rewarding arsenic-focused allocations or a truth-telling condition in which one preferred well is installed regardless of its potential impact.

Overall, the two interventions–incentives and information–will be cross-randomized, hence forming four treatment arms. This design will allow us to separately identify both informational and preference-based barriers to arsenic-reducing well allocations. A total of 250 unions will be randomized into the four treatment arms, plus one more arm for “backup” unions, in case of attrition from union leaders. A total of 200 unions will thus be surveyed.

Experimental design

We randomly assign a primary sample of 200 unions to four treatment groups. This randomization is stratified by the arsenic exposure reduction of past public well allocations and by upazila (details below). We also randomly assign an additional 50 unions to a “backup” pool to serve as replacements for either treatment or control groups if needed.
The 250 total unions belong to 23 upazilas. All data required for stratification come from the ARRP (Arsenic Risk Reduction Program), which tested 6.3 million drinking-water wells across the country for arsenic. The data includes the type of the well (public vs. private), along with the arsenic testing results from field test kits. A random subset of the well water samples was analyzed in DPHE laboratories, the results of which were used to recalibrate the test kit results.
For each union, we compute the arsenic exposure reduction of past well allocations using the same formula we describe in the explanation for its use as a primary outcome.
For upazilas with a sufficient number of unions (i.e., at least 10 unions), we split the upazila’s unions into two strata based on their past well allocation score. For upazilas with fewer than 10 unions, we use the upazila itself as the stratum. This leads to a total of 38 strata, which we use to conduct the stratified randomization into the four primary groups. The 50 backup unions will be kept in a randomly generated order; upon not being able to work with a given primary union, we will replace it with a backup union using this pre-determined sequence.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer using R, using set.seed for reproducibility
Randomization unit
Union
Clusters
200 unions
Observations
200 unions / 800 chosen wells
Arms
Control - 50 unions / 200 chosen wells T1 (incentive, no information) - 50 unions / 200 chosen wells T2 (no incentive, information) - 50 unions / 200 chosen wells T3 (incentive, information) - 50 unions / 200 chosen wells
Primary outcomes
Arsenic exposure reduction of well allocation, from elicited allocations
Secondary outcomes
Union Parishad Chairman -Arsenic understanding (after using the application–before the app is shared will be used for heterogeneity) -Self-described motivations for final allocation -Average levels of household wealth, education, and other observable characteristics in the mauzas chosen by the union leader -Average level of arsenic in the mauzas chosen by the union leader -Arsenic level of the mauzas in the wells chosen by the union leader -Average level of population density in the mauzas chosen by the union leader -Proxies for political gains from, and political pressure for, well allocations -Choice of the union leader's own mauza

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