Land Property Rights and Agricultural Investment in the Philippines: Experimental Evidence on Impacts and Mechanisms

How to cite

Gunnsteinsson, Snaebjorn. 2013. "Land Property Rights and Agricultural Investment in the Philippines: Experimental Evidence on Impacts and Mechanisms." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000168. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.168-2.2

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Snaebjorn Gunnsteinsson*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000168
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.168-2.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2014-04-25 – 2017-10-30
Countries
Philippines ()
Secondary IDs
OW4/1990
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/168

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of formal property rights on agricultural investment and the channels – access to credit, tenure security, and gains from trade – through which this effect may occur. The research question will be tested within the context of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in the Philippines, where collective titles have been issued to groups of farmers as a transition mechanism to hasten the land acquisition and distribution process. The government is now subdividing these collectively titled lands to formalize individual property rights (referred hereafter as parcelization), and the study will exploit this program to conduct a cluster-randomized controlled trial (randomizing collective titles into treatment and control groups) with the goal of understanding the impact of rights on investment and the degree to which the lack of formal rights limits financial market development.

Intervention

The intervention being evaluated is the parcelization program described in the abstract. The Department of Agrarian Reform is subdividing land that is collectively titled by conducting land surveys and issuing individual titles to those farmers previously listed under the collective title. Note that although land may be collectively titled, a distinction must be made between farm ownership and management: most of the farms under these titles are farmed individually, not collectively.

Experimental design

The heart of the evaluation design is a cluster-randomized controlled trial that randomly selects collective titles to be subdivided, or "parceled out". The control group will not be parcelized for at least two years of the evaluation, allowing sufficient time for farmers to make significant agricultural investment decisions before a follow-up survey is conducted.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Collective land titles
Clusters
500 collective titles
Observations
2800 farmers
Arms
250 treatment collective titles, 250 control collective titles
Primary outcomes
agricultural investment, output, profit, and welfare

Materials

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Keywords