The Impact of Moral Persuasion and Dynamic Pricing on Energy Conservation in Japan
How to cite
Ito, Koichiro; Tanaka, Makoto; Ida, Takanori. 2016. "The Impact of Moral Persuasion and Dynamic Pricing on Energy Conservation in Japan." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001670. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1670-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Firms and governments often use moral suasion and economic incentives to influence intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for various economic activities. To investigate the persistence of such interventions, we randomly assigned households to moral suasion and dynamic pricing that stimulate energy conservation during peak demand hours. Using household-level consumption data for 30-minute intervals, we find significant short-run effects of moral suasion, but the effects diminished quickly after repeated interventions. Economic incentives produced larger and persistent effects, which induced habit formation after the final interventions. While each policy produces substantial welfare gains, economic incentives provide particularly large gains when we consider persistence.
Intervention
Control Group: The households in this group received an advanced electricity meter,
an in-home display, and the participation reward. Other than that, this group did not receive any treatment.
Moral Suasion Group: The households in this group received an advanced electricity meter, an in-home display, and the participation reward. In addition, this group received "moral suasion for energy conservation;" they were encouraged to voluntarily conserve energy.
Economic Incentive Group: The households in this group received an advanced
electricity meter, an in-home display, and the participation reward. In addition, this group received an "economic incentive for energy conservation;" the price they were charged for energy increased during peak hours.
Experimental design
We consider two policy interventions that are most widely used by policymakers in practice. The first intervention is moral suasion, by which policymakers attempt to influence intrinsic motivation for various economic activities. The second intervention is an economic incentive, by which policymakers attempt to influence extrinsic motivation based on standard demand theory. Our main outcome variable is household-level electricity consumption for every 30 minutes. We began by randomly assigning households to one of 3 groups: 1) a moral suasion group, 2) an economic incentive group, and 3) a control group. On peak demand days in summer and winter, we delivered day-ahead and same-day notifications about treatments. For electricity usage during peak demand hours on peak demand days, the moral suasion group received a message requesting voluntary energy conservation with no economic incentives. The economic incentive group was charged high electricity prices during the peak demand hours. We repeated these interventions to analyze hot versus cold decision-making among the groups. The repeated interventions allowed us to estimate how treatment effects change between the first intervention and subsequent interventions. Moreover, we collected electricity usage data after the final interventions to examine potential habit formation. Finally, we conducted a detailed follow-up survey to investigate the mechanism behind our findings.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Ito, Koichiro, Takanori Ida, and Makoto Tanaka. "The Persistence of Moral Suasion and Economic Incentives: Field Experimental Evidence from Energy Demand." Working Paper, April 2015. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/4195_MoralSuasion%20and%20Incentives_Ito_NBERApril2015.pdf
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