Payoff variance in preference elicitation with the BDM mechanism
How to cite
Palma, Marco; Horlick, Benjamin; Drichoutis, Andreas. 2025. "Payoff variance in preference elicitation with the BDM mechanism." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016635. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16635-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Under expected utility theory, the range of the bid distribution in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism should not influence bidding behavior. However, there is overwhelming empirical evidence showing it does. We examine the relationship between the upper bound of the range for the randomly drawn price in the BDM mechanism and the variance of the payoff. Treating payoff variance as a measure of risk, we develop a framework that causally explains empirical under/overbidding behavior shifts due to changes in the support set distribution. We then present results from an experiment eliciting willingness-to-accept after endowing subjects with an induced value card worth a fixed amount and varying the random offer support set’s upper bound. We analyze within-subject effects among three BDM rounds and explore heterogeneous responses due to varying risk preferences that we hypothesize will result in aggregate under/overbidding or more symmetrical bids around the induced value.
Intervention
We implement the BDM mechanism in three repeated rounds to elicit willingness-to-accept for an induced value item. The value of the item is held constant at $3. The distribution of possible offers ranges from $0 to an upper bound that is exogenously changed each round to $4, $6, and $12 in random order. Shifting the upper bound changes the variance of the payoff, and we hypothesize it impacts subject behavior to explain overbidding (in $12), underbidding (in $4) and more symmetrical bidding (in $6) around the induced value.
Experimental design
Our experiment is divided in two parts. In the first part, subjects are asked to submit offers to sell a card worth $3 to the experimenter. We vary on a within-subjects basis the upper bound of the support set at $4, $6, and $12 in three repeated rounds in random order with the lower bound remaining at $0. At the end of the experiment, one of the three rounds is selected for realization. Following the BDM mechanism task, we ask respondents about their strategy selection process and give them the opportunity to explain a rationale in an open response format.
The second part of the experiment elicits subjects' risk preferences. We implement the static version of the BRET (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013). Subjects complete the task once with no practice rounds. The task presents participants with 100 boxes arranged in a 10x10 grid. One randomly selected box holds a bomb while the other 99 contain a reward of $0.10. Each subject then chooses how many boxes to collect. If the bomb is among the selected quantity of boxes, the participant receives no additional earnings from the task; otherwise, we add the amount of money inside the collected boxes to the subject's total payoff.
As a secondary measure of risk preferences, we also employ the self-reported risk question from the German Socio-Economic Panel survey (Dohmen et al., 2011).
Design details
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