School Subsidies as a Commitment Device
How to cite
Layvant, Michelle; Ferres, Gonzalo. 2025. "School Subsidies as a Commitment Device." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016626. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16626-5.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study evaluates the demand for commitment in education by measuring caregivers’ willingness to trade off school-fee subsidies against unconditional cash transfers. We implement a randomized controlled trial with 2,000 pupils across 30 government primary schools in Jinja District, Uganda. Caregivers first complete an incentive-compatible multiple price list eliciting their preferences between a direct subsidy and varying amounts of cash. Pupils are then randomly assigned to one of three treatment arms or a control group: (i) a direct subsidy covering Term 1 dues, (ii) an unconditional cash transfer at the start of Term 1, or (iii) an unconditional cash transfer delivered immediately at the time of the survey. The design allows us to quantify the demand for subsidies as a commitment device and to compare the relative effectiveness of different financial instruments in supporting educational investment. Primary outcomes include enrollment, attendance, and learning.
Intervention
This study evaluates whether school-fee subsidies function as a commitment device relative to unconditional cash transfers, and whether the timing of liquidity affects educational investment. The study is implemented in 30 government-run primary schools in Jinja District, Uganda, with a sample of 2,000 pupils completing Primary 4 or Primary 6 and their primary caregivers.
At baseline, caregivers complete an incentive-compatible preference elicitation exercise designed to measure willingness to pay for (i) a direct school-fee subsidy relative to unconditional cash delivered at the time school fees are due, and (ii) delayed cash delivered at the start of the school term relative to immediate cash. The elicitation uses adaptive multiple price list tasks in which caregivers make repeated choices between a fixed transfer of UGX 35,000 (approximately equal to Term 1 school fees) and varying alternatives. To ensure truthful reporting, a randomly selected 2 percent of caregivers receive a real payout based on a Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism; these households are excluded from the main analysis.
After completing the preference elicitation module, households are randomly assigned at the individual level to one of four groups:
(a) Subsidy (Treatment 1): A direct payment of UGX 35,000 made to the child’s school at the start of Term 1, conditional on the child re-enrolling in the same school.
(b) Cash at Start of Term (Treatment 2): An unconditional cash transfer of UGX 35,000 delivered to the caregiver at the beginning of Term 1.
(c) Cash Now (Treatment 3): An unconditional cash transfer of UGX 35,000 delivered to the caregiver immediately following the baseline survey.
(d) Control: No transfer.
All cash transfers are delivered via mobile money, and transfer amounts are equal across treatment arms. The design allows comparisons between (i) receiving any financial support versus no support, (ii) subsidies versus equivalently sized cash transfers delivered at the same time to isolate the value of commitment, and (iii) cash delivered immediately versus at the school-fee deadline to assess the role of timing and saving ability.
The intervention builds on a pilot conducted in January 2025 in nine schools in Jinja District, which documented strong stated demand for school-fee subsidies but did not experimentally compare subsidies to cash. The full trial expands this design by randomizing across subsidy, delayed cash, and immediate cash arms, enabling causal tests of both effectiveness and underlying preferences for commitment and liquidity.
Experimental design
The study will be conducted in government-run primary schools in Jinja District, Uganda. The target sample consists of pupils who were enrolled in Primary 4 or Primary 6 during Term 3 of the 2025 academic year, as recorded in official class registers. Focusing on pupils enrolled in Term 3 allows the study to capture dropout and enrollment decisions that occur during the transition between school years.
Thirty government primary schools will be selected from the set of eligible schools in Jinja District. Within these schools, a total of 2,000 pupils will be selected using stratified sampling by school, grade, and gender to ensure balance across treatment groups. Treatment is assigned at the individual (pupil/household) level.
Baseline data collection will take place during the school holiday preceding the new academic year. During this period, caregivers complete surveys and a structured preference elicitation exercise measuring tradeoffs between school-fee subsidies and unconditional cash transfers, as well as between immediate and delayed cash. Treatment assignment is revealed only after completion of the baseline survey and preference elicitation module.
Following baseline data collection, households are randomly assigned to one of four groups: (i) a direct school-fee subsidy paid to the child’s school at the start of Term 1, (ii) an unconditional cash transfer delivered at the start of Term 1, (iii) an unconditional cash transfer delivered immediately after the baseline survey, or (iv) a control group that receives no transfer. Transfer values are equal across treatment arms.
Endline data collection will occur during Term 1. Outcomes are measured using a combination of school administrative records, unannounced school visits conducted throughout the term to measure attendance, and independent child assessments and caregiver surveys administered at endline.
Design details
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