A Field Experiment on Information from Senders with Shared or Divergent Identities
How to cite
Wang, Siyu; Li, Tongzhe. 2025. "A Field Experiment on Information from Senders with Shared or Divergent Identities." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016608. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16608-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Information is often cited as a key driver of public opinion and behavioral change. Moreover, the identity of the messenger can shape how information is received, with evidence from the literature suggesting that echo chambers form around many issues. In this study, we examine three main questions:
1. Do information receivers prefer messages from identity-matched senders or from identity-mismatched senders?
2. Does identity matching, i.e. receiving messages from a sender who shares versus differs in identify measured by prioritization of profit versus environmental friendliness, influence participants’ beliefs about the effectiveness of a technology and their willingness to pay for it?
3. Does the stated priority of the message sender affect participants’ beliefs about the effectiveness of a technology and their willingness to pay for it?
To answer these questions, we will conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment at the 2025 Canada’s Outdoor Farm Show (COFS) in Ontario, Canada. Participants will first indicate their priorities regarding environmental versus profit-based dimensions of fertilizer management, a key practice for agricultural production. They will then receive information from a real agronomist, who represents advisors who prioritize either profitability or environmental friendliness. After viewing this information, participants will answer a question about the perceived effectiveness of and bid for a fertilizer management product using a cost-share Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964).
Intervention
Timeline and Sample
Farmers will be recruited at COFS in Woodstock (Ontario) between September 9-11, 2025 to participate in a sender-selection task followed by an experimental auction in the format of cost-share BDM mechanism. Each participant will place a bid on a fertilizer management product, specifically a dual nitrogen inhibitor used in conjunction with fertilizers. COFS is one of the largest outdoor farm shows in Eastern Canada and an ideal venue to run a field experiment as it attracts more than 40,000 farmers annually.
Overview of Experiment
This experiment will establish the causal relationship with how information sources (see Table 1 for the specific treatments) affect farmers’ beliefs on the benefits of fertilizer management and their bids for relevant product. We are going to conduct this experiment over the course of three days. Each participant will bid on the required cost-share amount ∈[0%,100%] for the product. After submitting their bids, participants will go through a post-experiment questionnaire and answer demographic and farm-specific questions. Each farmer will receive $20 (CAD) for participating in the experiment. Python language will be used to program this experiment, and participants will use HTML pages shown on iPads to provide their inputs.
Table 1. Between-subjects treatments randomized at the individual level.
Treatment Receiver Identity/Preference Sender Identity
T1 A/B Prioritize Environmentally Friendliness Prioritize Environmentally Friendliness
T2 A/B Prioritize Profitability Prioritize Profitability
T3 A/B Prioritize Environmentally Friendliness Prioritize Profitability
T4 A/B Prioritize Profitability Prioritize Environmentally Friendliness
Ex-ante power analysis shows that to detect a treatment effect in the size of 5 percentage points in terms of bid difference in the cost-share auction with an uninformed untreated mean and a standard deviation of 10%, the minimum sample size needs to be 64 per treatment group; a total sample size of 512 (64 x 8) to detect the effect of different appeals based on pairwise comparisons. Since representative farmers are recruited at a specific event, we expect the sample size will depend on the attendance at the COFS. We aim for a minimum of 512 participants while trying to reach 750 participants if conditions permit. Power analyses are based on a 5% significance level with 80% power, which is standard practice in the literature.
Description of the incentive-compatibility component of the experiment
A cost-share BDM mechanism will be used to ensure incentive compatibility (i.e., each participant will be incentivized to bid their actual valuation). At the end of the experiment, participants will be randomly chosen via computer with a probability of one out of a hundred to have their bid evaluated. An “experimental market price” (representing the percentage of the cost to be paid by the participant, which is equivalent to 100% – the percentage of the cost to be subsidized by the experimenter) will be randomly selected from a distribution based on actual subsidies available in the real world. Each randomly selected participant’s bid for the product will be compared to the “experimental market price.” If the participant’s bid is equal or higher, then they will purchase the product at the “experimental market price.” If the bid is lower, then they will not purchase the product. Under this mechanism, participants don’t want to over-bid as there is no competition against others while over-bidding may result in paying a price higher than their actual valuation. Participants also don’t want to under-bid because in such a case they may forego the opportunity of purchasing the product at a price lower than their actual valuation (i.e., at a subsidized price through the cost-share mechanism).
Experimental design
Overview of Experiment
This experiment will establish the causal relationship with how information sources (see Table 1 for the specific treatments) affect farmers’ beliefs on the benefits of fertilizer management and their bids for relevant product. We are going to conduct this experiment over the course of three days. Each participant will bid on the required cost-share amount ∈[0%,100%] for the product. After submitting their bids, participants will go through a post-experiment questionnaire and answer demographic and farm-specific questions. Each farmer will receive $20 (CAD) for participating in the experiment. Python language will be used to program this experiment, and participants will use HTML pages shown on iPads to provide their inputs.
Table 1. Between-subjects treatments randomized at the individual level.
Treatment Receiver Identity/Preference Sender Identity
T1 A/B Prioritize Environmentally Friendliness Prioritize Environmentally Friendliness
T2 A/B Prioritize Profitability Prioritize Profitability
T3 A/B Prioritize Environmentally Friendliness Prioritize Profitability
T4 A/B Prioritize Profitability Prioritize Environmentally Friendliness
Design details
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