The Impact of Uncertainty on Take-Up and Subsequent Investment in New Technologies Among Farmers in Zambia

How to cite

Jack, B. Kelsey; Walker, Elizabeth; Bell, Samuel; Severen, Christopher; Oliva, Paulina; NBER. 2016. "The Impact of Uncertainty on Take-Up and Subsequent Investment in New Technologies Among Farmers in Zambia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001659. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1659-1.0

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B. Kelsey Jack* , Elizabeth Walker , Samuel Bell , Christopher Severen , Paulina Oliva , NBER

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001659
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1659-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2011-11-01 – 2015-06-23
Countries
Zambia (Chipata, Eastern Province)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1659

Abstract

Technology adoption often requires investments over time. As new information about the costs and benefits of investment is realized, agents may prefer to abandon a technology that appeared profitable at the time of take-up. This re-optimization can reduce the cost-effectiveness of adoption subsidies. We use a field experiment with two stages of randomization to generate exogenous variation in the payoffs associated with take-up and subsequent investment in a new technology: a tree species that provides private fertilizer benefits to adopting farmers. Our empirical results show high rates of abandoning the technology, even after paying a positive price to take it up. The experimental variation offers a novel source of identification for a structural model of intertemporal decision making under uncertainty. Estimation results indicate that the farmers experience idiosyncratic shocks to net payoffs after take-up, which increase take-up but lower average per farmer tree survival. We simulate counterfactual outcomes under different levels of uncertainty and observe that farmers with high returns are able to self-select at take-up only when the level of uncertainty is relatively low. Thus, uncertainty provides an additional explanation for why many subsidized technologies may not be utilized even when take-up is high.

Experimental design

The researchers conducted a two-period randomized field experiment. In the first stage, groups of 10-15 Zambian farmers were offered a package of tree seedlings which provide private fertilization benefits 7-10 years after planting. The groups are randomly assigned to receive 1 of 4 subsidy amounts to help purchase the seedlings and to introduce exogenous variation in payoff at the take-up decision. The subsidy amounts are 0 ZMK (no subsidy), 4000 ZMK, 8000 ZMK, and 12000 ZMK (fully subsidized).

In the second stage of the experiment, individual farmers drew lots to receive a reward conditional on the survival of at least 35 trees one year after purchase of the seedlings. The rewards ranged from 0 ZMK (no reward) to 150,000 ZMK in increments of 1000 ZMK. This introduced exogenous variation in payoff at the follow-through decision. Data was collected from a baseline survey, an endline survey, and from a mid-experiment survey from a subsample of the farmers.

The multi-period experimental treatment of statistically independent samples offered an alternative to panel data, allowed the researchers to identify a structural model of intertemporal decisions that can distinguish between static and dynamic explanations for the outcomes.

Design details

Randomization method
For the first stage of randomization, groups of 10-15 farmers are randomly assigned to receive 1 of 4 subsidies for seedling purchase: No subsidy, 4000 ZMK, 8000 ZMK, or 12,000 ZMK. For the second stage, individuals drew lots from a bucket for a reward ranging from no reward to 150,000 ZMK, contingent on keeping a minimum number of trees alive for one year
Randomization unit
First stage of randomization: groups of farmers Second stage of randomization: individual farmers
Clusters
125 farmer groups
Observations
1314 farmers
Arms
Subsidy treatment: 1092 farmers, randomly assigned to receive 1 of 4 subsidies: 0 ZMK, 4000 ZMK, 8000 ZMK, 12000 ZMK Reward treatment: 1092 farmers, randomly assigned to receive a reward ranging from 0 ZMK to 150,000 ZMK contingent on keeping at least 35 trees alive after one year Surprise treatment: 690 farmers, randomly selected to be told of the reward after the take-up decision Monitoring treatment: 173 farmers, randomly selected to a mid-year survey detailing tree-care activities
Primary outcomes
Take-up (measured as purchase of the seedlings); Follow-through (measured as keeping 35 or more trees alive); Tree survival greater than 0; No tree survival

Papers from this trial

  1. Jack, B. Kelsey, Paulina Oliva, Christopher Severen, Elizabeth Walker, and Samuel Bell. "Technology Adoption Under Uncertainty: Take-Up and Subsequent Investment in Zambia." NBER Working Paper No. 21414, July 2015 http://www.nber.org/papers/w21414

Cited by

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Keywords