Third party evaluation in conservation auctions

How to cite

Liu, Zhaoyang; Cason, Timothy N.; Yang, Xiaojun; Hanley, Nick. 2025. "Third party evaluation in conservation auctions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016584. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16584-1.0

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Zhaoyang Liu* , Timothy N. Cason , Xiaojun Yang , Nick Hanley

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016584
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16584-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-09-10 – 2026-03-10
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C93, D44, Q57
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16584

Abstract

The past few decades have seen extensive amounts of budgets spent on the procurement of land-based environmental goods, as in public schemes such as the American Conservation Reserve Program and the Chinese counterpart, the Sloping Land Conversion Programme, as well as in private schemes such as the UK’s biodiversity offsetting market. These schemes typically pay private landholders for the provision of environmental benefits through changing land use practices such as restoring natural vegetation on rural land. The payments are often conditional on a third party’s evaluation of certain indicators or proxies of the environmental goods being delivered, where the third party’s position could be influenced if they are commissioned by private landholders seeking a favourable evaluation outcome to outcompete other suppliers of the environmental goods. Through a framed field experiment using Chinese farmer subjects, this study will for the first time investigate whether such environmental procurement may have different levels of conservation efficacy depending on the commission fees for third-party evaluators and the competition among them. Each experimental session will consist of four farmer subjects as ‘bidders’, each of whom will propose a rural land greening project in competition for a reward, and another two farmer participants as ‘referees’ evaluating the proposed projects at an evaluation fee paid by each bidder out of an endowment allocated to them by an experimenter. We will have two treatments that differ in the bidders’ flexibility in deciding the amount of the evaluation fee, which will allow us to examine the implications for auction performance. Moreover, we will have another treatment that mitigates the competition between the two referees, to assess whether the impacts of evaluation fees are less pronounced when the referees become less competitive. This study will make a unique contribution to the literature on conservation auctions and more generally to the literature on bribery and corruption in competitive procurement.

Experimental design

This is a hypothetical auction game which will be conducted in framed-field-experiment settings with Chinese farmer subjects recruited in Shaanxi province. The results of the auction game will determine participating farmers’ real payoffs from attending the game but have no implications for their real land use practices. Each auction group will consist of four farmer subjects as ‘bidders’, each of whom will propose a rural land greening project in competition for a fixed-size reward (RMB 20), and another two farmer subjects as ‘referees’ evaluating the proposed projects at an evaluation fee paid by each bidder out of an endowment allocated to them by an experimenter. The two projects with the best evaluation results will be rewarded. Each auction group will undertake a total of six auction periods, where each period is an independent one-shot auction that re-assigns the bidders’ endowments and greening projects (represented by pictures showing land cover before and after a project), and determines which projects are rewarded and all the participants’ net payoffs in this period. Each auction group will be randomly assigned to one of the three between-group treatments mentioned above in the Intervention Section, which will allow us to assess whether auction performance is impacted if different bidders are allowed to pay different amounts of evaluation fees to the same referee, and whether such impacts depend on the competitiveness between the two referees. Moreover, each auction period will be randomly assigned to one of the three within-group treatments, which differ in the correlation between the environmental benefits of a greening project and whether a bidder is better positioned to pay a higher evaluation fee.

Design details

Randomization method
Each auction group will be randomly assigned to one of the three between-group treatments (T1–T3). The randomisation will be performed in advance using a random number generator on a computer, making sure that the three treatments have the same number of auction groups. Each auction group will undertake a total of six auction periods (six independent auctions), and each period will be randomly assigned to one of the three within-group treatments (W1–W3), where each within-group treatment has two sets of greening pictures and endowments which will be assigned to two auction periods (and so in total there are six sets of greening pictures and endowments). This is equivalent to randomly reordering the six sets of greening pictures and endowments for different auction groups, which will be performed in advance using a random number generator on a computer. This randomisation procedure will be performed only once for the auction groups in one between-group treatment, and the same assignment will be adopted by the other two between-group treatments. Another condition of this randomisation procedure is to ensure that within one between-group treatment, the last four auction periods in total (over all the auction groups) have a balanced assignment of W1, W2 and W3, because each of the three treatments has a specific type of correlation between the environmental benefits of a greening project and whether a bidder is better positioned to pay a higher evaluation fee, and we will test the main hypotheses using the data from the last four auction periods only.
Randomization unit
Auction group
Clusters
54 auction groups in total Note: the between-group treatments are not clustered – both the randomisation and the main data analyses will be conducted at the auction group level.
Observations
54 auction groups in total
Arms
18 groups in each between-group treatment (T1, T2 or T3)
Primary outcomes
The total environmental benefit index of rewarded projects
Secondary outcomes
Total evaluation fees

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Keywords