Fiscal Accountability: Institutional Discipline and Behavioral Frictions

How to cite

Wang, Yizhi; Saporiti, Alejandro. 2025. "Fiscal Accountability: Institutional Discipline and Behavioral Frictions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016567. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16567-2.1

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Yizhi Wang* , Alejandro Saporiti

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016567
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16567-2.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2024-10-15 – 2026-05-15
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91; D72; H11; H41
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16567

Abstract

We study fiscal accountability in a laboratory election environment in which candidates compete over a full fiscal platform consisting of a budget and its allocation between a public good and private rents. The theory predicts that more disproportional power-sharing rules raise the electoral stakes of winning and therefore discipline rent extraction. The experiment is designed to test five hypotheses. First, greater power-sharing disproportionality should reduce corruption, increase public-good provision, and improve aggregate voter welfare. Second, if voters behave fully rationally, human voters should not differ from automated utility-maximizing voters. Third, explicit disclosure of rents should not matter when voters can infer rents from the budget constraint. Fourth, greater disproportionality should weaken the rent-increasing effect of stronger partisanship. Fifth, away from equilibrium, a candidate may sustain higher rents by bundling them with higher public-good provision when the benchmark platform provides too little of the public good relative to the socially efficient benchmark. We implement seven laboratory treatments at Tianjin University with 376 student subjects. Main outcomes are candidate policy choices, vote choice and vote share, and aggregate voter welfare.

Intervention

This is a laboratory experiment implementing a three-stage election game. In each of 25 periods, two candidates simultaneously propose a fiscal platform. The platform consists of a budget or tax rate and an allocation of that budget between a public good that benefits all voters and a private good interpreted as political rents. Five voters then observe the platforms and vote for candidate A or candidate B. The electoral outcome determines political influence through a power-sharing rule.

The design includes seven treatments:

Treatment T1 (Baseline) implements the model with a proportional power-sharing rule, low partisan intensity, human voters, and partial fiscal transparency, where voters observe only the proposed tax and public good levels and must infer corruption from the budget constraint.

Treatment T2 (Automated Voters) is identical to the baseline, except that the five human voters are replaced by five automated agents programmed to vote sincerely for the party offering them the highest utility. Comparison between T1 and T2 tests Hypothesis 2.

Treatment T3 (Transparency) is identical to the baseline, except that voters are explicitly shown the level of rents proposed by each candidate. Comparison between T1 and T3 tests Hypothesis 3.

Treatment T4 (Disproportional Rule) is identical to the baseline, except that it implements a more disproportional power-sharing rule. The comparison between T1 and T4 provides a direct test of Hypothesis 1.

Treatments T5--T6 (Disproportionality--Partisanship Interaction) replicate the proportional and disproportional power-sharing rules under stronger partisan intensity. Together with T1 and T4, they form a two-by-two factorial design that varies the electoral rule and the strength of partisan bias, providing a direct test of Hypothesis 4.

Treatment T7 (Public-Good Gambit) is a scripted-candidate election treatment in which the candidates' platforms are pre-programmed by the computer. In each round, five human voters observe the two platforms under full transparency and cast their votes, so the electoral outcome continues to depend on aggregate voter support. The scripted platform pairs are organized around two benchmark environments: one in which the benchmark platform provides the socially efficient amount of the public good, and one in which the benchmark platform provides too little of the public good. In each environment, the opposing scripted platform combines a fixed increase in rents with different amounts of additional public-good provision.

The experiment uses a common theoretical calibration in which both private consumption and public-good benefits are valued with diminishing marginal returns, there is no office rent or valence advantage built into the candidates, income is fixed across participants, and partisan bias is introduced through an individual-specific predisposition toward one of the candidates. Some treatments use weaker partisan bias and others use stronger partisan bias.

Hypothesis 1 (H1):Greater power-sharing disproportionality is expected to promote stronger fiscal discipline. Under the disproportional rule treatment, relative to the proportional baseline, we predict that candidates will propose lower levels of corruption, greater provision of public goods, and, as a result, higher aggregate voter welfare.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Policy payoffs lead voters to electorally punish rent-seeking behavior and reward public-good provision. Under the assumption of voter rationality, we predict no significant differences between a treatment with automated utility-maximizing voters and a baseline with human voters.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Greater fiscal transparency does not necessarily improve voter accountability. Under the assumption of voter rationality, we predict that equilibrium policy will be similar in a treatment where political rent levels are explicitly disclosed to voters and in a baseline where corruption must be inferred from the budget constraint.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Greater disproportionality weakens the rent-increasing effect of stronger partisanship. When the electoral rule and partisan intensity are varied independently, we predict that the increase in corruption caused by stronger partisanship will be smaller under the disproportional rule than under the proportional baseline.

Hypothesis 5 (H5): The electoral viability of the public-good gambit depends on whether public-good provision at the benchmark platform is already socially efficient. Comparing candidate vote shares across scripted platform pairs, we predict that combining higher rents with additional public goods should not improve electoral support when the benchmark platform already provides the efficient amount of the public good, but can improve support when the benchmark platform provides too little of the public good and the increase in public-good provision is large enough.

Experimental design

The experiment implements the election game from the model over 25 repeated periods. Treatments T1 through T6 involve two candidates and five voters in each electoral interaction, except that T2 replaces the five human voters with automated voting agents. In T1 and T3 through T6, subjects are randomly re-matched each period into groups of seven, consisting of two candidates and five voters. In T2, each group consists of two human candidates paired with five computer algorithms. In T7, subjects are randomly re-matched each period into groups of five voters, while the two candidates' platforms are scripted by the computer. The election environment is preserved in T7 because aggregate voter support still determines the electoral outcome between the scripted platforms.

The treatment structure is designed to identify the effect of a disproportional versus proportional power-sharing rule, the difference between human and automated voters, the effect of explicit rent disclosure, the interaction between disproportionality and partisanship, and the off-equilibrium public-good gambit.

The design combines between-treatment variation with repeated within-subject play and random rematching across periods. The main comparison for institutional discipline is between T1 and T4. The comparison between T1 and T2 tests voter rationality. The comparison between T1 and T3 tests transparency. Treatments T1, T4, T5, and T6 form a two-by-two factorial design in the power-sharing rule and partisan intensity. T7 isolates voter responses to scripted platform pairs in a fully transparent environment.

Design details

Randomization method
Computerized randomization. Within treatments, participants are randomly re-matched across periods by the experimental software. Treatment assignment should be recorded at the session level to avoid contamination across treatments; if the current registry already lists the exact session-level procedure, retain that wording.
Randomization unit
Primary treatment variation: experimental session. Within-session rematching: group composition is randomized each period. In T7, scripted platform pairs are assigned by the computer across rounds.
Clusters
72 groups
Observations
1200 observations at the candidate's level, and 7000 observations at the voter level.
Arms
Each treatment has at least two sessions with 56 subjects (16 candidates and 40 voters) and 25 rounds, with the only exception that T7 has four sessions. Therefore, the minimum sample size is (8*25*6=)1200 (winners of the elections) for the candidate analysis and (20*25*10+20*25*4=)7000 for the voting analysis.
Primary outcomes
Candidate policy choices: proposed political rents or corruption, proposed public-good provision, and proposed budget or tax rate. Electoral outcomes: candidate vote share and individual voter choice. Aggregate voter welfare. In the scripted-candidate treatment, vote share and individual support for the deviating platform.
Secondary outcomes
Responsiveness of voting to utility differences and to differences in rents, public-good provision, and taxes. Interaction between partisan bias and policy responsiveness, which captures the partisan-shield mechanism. Treatment interactions between disproportionality and partisan intensity. Time trends and learning in candidate policy choices across rounds.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords