The Impact of Religion on Conservation: Evidence from Burundi
How to cite
Naso, Pedro; Budurha, Jean; Irakoze, Franck. 2025. "The Impact of Religion on Conservation: Evidence from Burundi." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016548. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16548-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study whether religion can promote conservation of natural resources. We run a field experiment in rural Burundi with forest users—forest owners and workers such as charcoal producers. Participants are randomly assigned to hear a religious stewardship message, a secular civic-duty message from Burundi’s environmental law, or a neutral message. They then play a public-goods game and decide how much to contribute to forest conservation. Contributions are real: 80% of the conservation account is donated to the office for the protection of forests in Burundi. We compare contributions across groups to test whether religious framing increases cooperation. We also examine heterogeneity by religiosity, affiliation, forest income, and pro-environmental perceptions. The study may inform outreach in places facing deforestation and other environmental problems. If the religious message performs best, this would indicate scope for environmental protection agencies and NGOs to work with clergy to promote conservation through co-designed, voluntary messaging. Beyond Burundi, the results can inform other resource-dependent, highly religious settings on when faith-based framing can complement secular outreach.
Intervention
We will prime our participants with three types of messages. Participants are randomly assigned to hear a religious stewardship message, a secular civic-duty message from Burundi’s environmental law, or a neutral message. They then play a public-goods game and decide how much to contribute to forest conservation.
Experimental design
We will run a simple randomized controlled trial with three groups. Participants are randomly assigned to: (1) a religious prime, (2) a secular prime, or (3) a neutral prime. All primes are short messages of similar length, read aloud in a neutral tone by enumerators. After the message, participants play a standard public-goods game. They receive an endowment and choose how much to keep in a private account and how much to place in a conservation account. If they contribute to the conservation account, they have a 20% chance of receiving the collective payoffs from that account, which simulate the positive impact of conservation for forest users. Eighty percent of their raw contributions (without the multiplier) is donated to OBPE, the forest agency of Burundi, to support forest protection. Participants make decisions individually and in private, and groups are formed randomly within treatment arms afterward.
Participants will be adult forest users in Muramvya, Mwaro, and Gitega. We include (i) forest owners who earn income from their forests and (ii) workers providing forest-related services (e.g., charcoal producers, transporters, sellers). We will request from OBPE an up-to-date list of forest users in the three provinces. From this list, we will draw a simple random sample, sampling proportionally by commune (the administrative unit below the province). If the OBPE list is incomplete, we will supplement it with a short listing exercise with local authorities and producer groups to identify additional eligible forest users, then randomly sample from the supplemented list.
Design details
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