On the acceptance of information avoidance
How to cite
Ekström, Mathias; Bilén, David; Iversen, Endre. 2025. "On the acceptance of information avoidance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016545. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16545-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
A growing literature documents that many individuals actively avoid information when facing trade-offs between self-interest and prosocial behavior. Individuals incur costs to avoid charity solicitations, decline to learn the carbon footprint of their consumption, or, in laboratory settings, choose to remain uninformed about recipients’ payoffs in dictator games. In this paper, we study whether—and under what conditions— third-party observers, from a general population sample of the United States, are willing to intervene and mandate that individuals be informed about the negative externalities of their actions.
Intervention
Design Overview:
We study when and why third parties are willing to intervene to ensure that another person makes an informed decision when their actions can impose a negative externality on another person. Third-party decision makers (“Spectators”) are randomly assigned, in a 2×3 between-subjects design, to evaluate cases involving a second person (“Person 1”).
Factors and Levels:
Factor 1 – Person 1’s information preference
- Person 1 prefers to be informed (Prefers information)
- Person 1 prefers not to be informed (Prefers no information)
Factor 2 – How providing information affects Person 1’s choice
- Information would change the choice in a pro-social direction (Impact—Pro-social)
- Information would not change the choice; the resulting choice is selfish (No impact—Selfish)
- Information would not change the choice; the resulting choice is pro-social (No impact—Pro-social)
By combing the two factors we have 6 treatment arms:
T1: Prefers information × Impact—Pro-social
T2: Prefers information × No impact—Selfish
T3: Prefers information × No impact—Pro-social
T1*: Prefers no information × Impact—Pro-social
T2*: Prefers no information × No impact—Selfish
T3*: Prefers no information × No impact—Pro-social
Primary Focus and Contrasts
Our primary interest is Spectators’ willingness to intervene and provide information against Person 1’s preference to remain uninformed. Accordingly, we focus on the three arms where Person 1 prefers no information (T1*, T2*, T3*) to evaluate research question R1 and R2:
R1. Instrumental effect of information on choice:
T1* vs T2* (does the willingness to impose information increase when it would make the action more pro-social?).
R2. Dependence on the realized choice when impact is zero:
T2* vs T3* (does the willingness to impose information depend on whether the choice is selfish or pro-social?).
The three arms where Person 1 prefers information (T1, T2, T3) mainly serve as benchmarks to gauge any general reluctance to intervene even when the recipient wants the information, and to answer our third research question.
R3. Dependence on Person 1’s information preference
T1 vs T1* / T2 vs T2* / T3 vs T3* (does the willingness to impose information depend on whether the dictator prefers information, within treatments?).
Experimental design
The experiment is consisting of two separate studies, which we here refer to as the "Preference-study" and the "Intervention-study".
The Preference-study is a so-called dictator game where participants are assigned to either the role of the dictator (Person 1) or the recipient (Person 2). In a within-subject design we then elicit Person 1's preference to be informed about the payoff consequences for Person 2, and how being (un)informed affects the allocation decision of Person 1. The sole purpose of the Preference-study is to ensure that we can provide truthful information about a decision that may have real consequences to the decision-maker in the Intervention-study. More details of the Preference-study will be provided in the experimental instructions of the paper.
The Intervention-study is the study that this trial refers to unless anything else is explicitly stated. It is based on a so-called spectator design where decision-makers, in the role of third party observers, are recruited to make a decision that may have real consequences for the final payoffs to participants in the Preference-study. The task for the decision-maker (or "Spectator") is to make a choice of whether to "Intervene" (i.e. inform Person 1 about the payoff consequences for Person 2) or "Not intervene" (i.e. not inform Person 1 about the payoff consequences for Person 2). We will use a 1:20 matching protocol, meaning that 20 spectators is matched to one Person 1, and one of the 20 spectator choices will actually be implemented.
As described in the Intervention section we randomly assign Spectators to one of 6 treatment arms in a 2*3 between-subject design that varies whether the Person 1 in the Preference-study prefers to be informed about the recipient's payoff or not, and whether information impacts the choice of Person 1 (Impact: Pro-social vs. No impact: Selfish vs. No impact: Pro-social).
Both studies are programmed in Qualtrics and use participants from Prolific. We ensure that participants are not taking part in both studies.
Design details
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