Estimating the effects of dynamic repayment incentives on loan performance
How to cite
Gupta, Apoorv; Ghosh, Pulak; Mezzanotti, Filippo; Zinman, Jonathan. 2025. "Estimating the effects of dynamic repayment incentives on loan performance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016541. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16541-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
We plan to identify effects of randomly assigned dynamic repayment incentives to borrowers on the performance of the borrowers on their loans. The messages will sent out by a large digital fintech lender in India to well-performing loans. The lender will randomly assign new loans in its portfolio to either receive a treatment (telling them they will automatically qualify to a receive a loan amount that is 3 times of the original loan upon timely repayment) or a control ( telling them they could qualify to a receive a loan amount that is 1.1 times of the original loan upon timely repayment). Estimates will help shed light on the importance of dynamic incentives (i.e. receiving more credit in the future) on borrowers’ repayment behavior.
Intervention
The experiment will include 50% randomly chosen consumers (“borrowers”) who have borrowed from the lender within the 30 days prior to the date of random assignment.. The lender provides loans for maturity of 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 12 months and 18 months.
The company plans to experiment with randomized settlement offers on about 1,500 borrowers with newly originated loans on a monthly basis. The sample will include borrowers who took out a new loan with the lender in the last 30 days. Only borrowers with maturity of 3-12 months are considered. The lender will randomly provide half of borrowers in this sample a message informing them that they will automatically qualify for a loan that is 3 times the size of their current loan amount upon timely repayment of their loan.
Borrowers who remain current through their loan term in any month will receive the same message every month during the intervention period per their initially assigned treatment group. That is, the borrower’s treatment assignment is unchanged once assigned. Borrowers that ever become delinquent on their loan stop receiving any message after becoming delinquent.
The lender will communicate offers, per its standard practices, with direct email and text messages that include instructions to contact the company for more information. Offer communications will be harmonized—in frequency, timing, and content—with the routine communications sent to the control group, to the fullest extent possible.
Experimental design
For each borrower in our sample, the lender will communicate treatment messages to half of the sample and control message to the other remaining half of the sample. We worked with the lender to stratify the randomization across four groups. These 4 groups are created by dividing the sample across two variables: (a) 2 bins reflecting the maturity of the underlying loan product; and (b) whether the borrower is a new customer with the company as defined in the month they first become part of the experiment sample (i.e. if the customer is a first-time borrower with the lender versus the customer has taken a loan from the lender in the past).
We will of course use the conditionally assigned discount for any intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis using the following specifications:
yit = a + b1 * Tit + sit + uit
where Tit is takes the value of 1 if borrower i in randomization month t. Control group is the omitted category. sit represent strata x experiment month fixed effect, where strata is one of the 4 groups defined by combination of product maturity and “new to the lender”. We will also analyze heterogeneous treatment effects based on the strata described above.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.