Delegation, Monitoring, and Supplier Engagement: A Field Experiment in Supply Chain Governance

How to cite

Xiahou, Qinrui; He, Guojun; Chen, Hao. 2025. "Delegation, Monitoring, and Supplier Engagement: A Field Experiment in Supply Chain Governance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016528. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16528-1.3

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Qinrui Xiahou* , Guojun He , Hao Chen

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016528
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16528-1.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2025-06-30 – 2026-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C93, D23, L14, M14, Q56
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16528

Abstract

We conduct a 2x2 factorial field experiment with a leading Chinese apparel brand and 155 of its suppliers to study how governance structure shapes supplier compliance with multi-dimensional reporting mandates. We independently vary decision authority (mandate versus delegation of KPI selection) and monitoring scope (comprehensive versus targeted carbon audit). Contrary to classical organizational theory, simpler governance structures generate substantially higher engagement among capacity-constrained small and medium-sized enterprises. Mandating a fixed KPI set reduces the missing-data rate by 10.4 percentage points relative to the control mean, while delegating KPI choice yields a negligible effect. Targeted carbon audits raise documentation coverage by 0.857 additional categories, roughly four times the effect of comprehensive audits. The two interventions are mutually reinforcing, with gains concentrated among smaller suppliers and in environmental reporting, where measurement standards are clearer and coordination costs are lower. We develop a model of bandwidth-constrained compliance that rationalizes these patterns and draw implications for the private regulation of externalities in global value chains.

Intervention

Targeted versus comprehensive ESG data verification and mandated versus self-selected ESG improvement metrics in supply chain management

Experimental design

Control;
T1 (Vertical Intervention): T1A (Mandated ESG Improvement Metrics) versus T1B (Self-Selected ESG Improvement Metrics);
T2 (Horizontal Intervention): T2A (Comprehensive ESG Data Verification) versus T2B (Targeted ESG Data Verification)

Design details

Randomization method
Stratified Randomization
Randomization unit
Firm (Supplier)
Clusters
N/A
Observations
155 firms * 12 months
Arms
Roughly 50 firms in control and 50 firms in each of the treatment arms (T1A, T1B, T2A, T2B) * Note that our treatment arms are cross-cutting with each other to investigate the interaction between different combinations of management practices
Primary outcomes
ESG and financial performance of suppliers (measured through a centralized data platform)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords