Contracting frictions, supply chain efficiency and market structure: evidence from Kenyan Agricultural Goods

How to cite

Wiseman, Eleanor. 2025. "Contracting frictions, supply chain efficiency and market structure: evidence from Kenyan Agricultural Goods." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016511. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16511-1.0

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Eleanor Wiseman*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016511
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16511-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2024-11-01 – 2025-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16511

Abstract

This project studies the efficiency of supply chains for agricultural goods in rural Kenya. Supply chains shape welfare throughout the chain from farmers, affecting incentives and profits, to consumers, impacting food security. As many supply chain transactions are governed by relational enforcement rather than spot markets, especially in low- and middle-income countries, we study how relational contracts influence supply chain efficiency. We illustrate that relational contracts create switching costs among buyer-supplier pairs. After analyzing a simple theoretical to formalize intuition, we run randomized interventions that i) incentivize new relationships and ii) alter the optimality of pairings to measure the switching costs from relational contracts and their implications for market efficiency.

Experimental design

Control
T1: Forced match: Incentives for new match between designated (and randomized) retailer and trader
T2: Free match: Incentives for new match between new retailer and trader of choice
T3: Price information: Price information about new market (increasing entry)

Randomization is at the market x good level (~4 goods; ~50-65 markets)

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization through stata
Randomization unit
Market x good
Clusters
~200 market x goods
Observations
~1000-1400 retailers/traders
Arms
25% Control; 25% T1 (forced); 30% T2 (free); 20% T3 (prices)
Primary outcomes
Intervention take-up, quantities, prices

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords