Pay Transparency: Exploring the Determinants of Allocation Decisions in the Absence of Incentives

How to cite

Pan, Xiaofei. 2025. "Pay Transparency: Exploring the Determinants of Allocation Decisions in the Absence of Incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016499. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16499-1.0

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Xiaofei Pan*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016499
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16499-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-08-07 – 2025-11-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91 D63
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16499

Abstract

This is a follow-up study to a previous experiment on pay transparency, in which decision makers allocated bonus between two matched workers under different transparency: partial transparency, full transparency and no transparency. In the original study, decision makers were incentivized based on the workers' performance in a subsequent addition task.
In the current study, a new treatment is introduced where decision-makers are not incentivized based on worker performance. They allocate bonuses between workers while receiving a fixed pay for completion (as in the original study), but no additional compensation based on workers' performance. This design isolates the role of social preferences in allocation decisions.
To further explore the underlying mechanisms, belief and motivation questions are included following the allocation tasks. A demographic survey will also be administered to collect background information and include an attention check.

Intervention

In the current study, a new treatment is introduced in which decision-makers are not incentivized based on worker performance. They allocate bonuses between workers while receiving a fixed payment for participation (as in the original study), but no additional compensation based on the workers' outcomes.

Decision makers will make allocation decisions across multiple scenarios. In each scenario, the two workers begin with endowments in both salary and benefit components. Worker 1 always has a higher total endowment than worker 2 by a fixed amount. Decision-makers choose from three allocation options for the bonus—either assigned to the salary or the benefit component—depending on the scenario. One option removes the inequality, one maintains the existing inequality, and the third enhances it.

At the end of the allocation tasks, decision makers also indicate their motives for their allocation choices and what they deem as important for workers performance.

Experimental design

Participants are recruited via Prolific and randomly assigned to complete a set of allocation scenarios. In each scenario, they allocate a fixed total budget of bonus across two workers. No financial incentive tied to the workers’ performance is provided to the decision maker.

After the allocation tasks, participants answer belief and motive questions assessing their expectations about how effort responds to different forms of earnings and their stated motivations for their decisions. These questions are designed to shed light on whether choices are driven by social preferences, perceptions of fairness, or beliefs about worker behavior.

This experiment will be compared descriptively to results from a previously run incentivized condition (not part of this pre-registration) to assess how incentives affect allocation behavior.

Design details

Randomization method
Program randomization
Randomization unit
Individual (participant-level). All participants in this study receive the same treatment (no incentive), and randomization applies to the order of allocation scenarios.
Clusters
Not applicable
Observations
200 decision maker
Arms
200
Primary outcomes
Allocation decisions
Secondary outcomes
motive for allocation; belief on factors influencing workers' effort

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords