Pay Transparency: Exploring the Determinants of Allocation Decisions in the Absence of Incentives
How to cite
Pan, Xiaofei. 2025. "Pay Transparency: Exploring the Determinants of Allocation Decisions in the Absence of Incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016499. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16499-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
This is a follow-up study to a previous experiment on pay transparency, in which decision makers allocated bonus between two matched workers under different transparency: partial transparency, full transparency and no transparency. In the original study, decision makers were incentivized based on the workers' performance in a subsequent addition task.
In the current study, a new treatment is introduced where decision-makers are not incentivized based on worker performance. They allocate bonuses between workers while receiving a fixed pay for completion (as in the original study), but no additional compensation based on workers' performance. This design isolates the role of social preferences in allocation decisions.
To further explore the underlying mechanisms, belief and motivation questions are included following the allocation tasks. A demographic survey will also be administered to collect background information and include an attention check.
Intervention
In the current study, a new treatment is introduced in which decision-makers are not incentivized based on worker performance. They allocate bonuses between workers while receiving a fixed payment for participation (as in the original study), but no additional compensation based on the workers' outcomes.
Decision makers will make allocation decisions across multiple scenarios. In each scenario, the two workers begin with endowments in both salary and benefit components. Worker 1 always has a higher total endowment than worker 2 by a fixed amount. Decision-makers choose from three allocation options for the bonus—either assigned to the salary or the benefit component—depending on the scenario. One option removes the inequality, one maintains the existing inequality, and the third enhances it.
At the end of the allocation tasks, decision makers also indicate their motives for their allocation choices and what they deem as important for workers performance.
Experimental design
Participants are recruited via Prolific and randomly assigned to complete a set of allocation scenarios. In each scenario, they allocate a fixed total budget of bonus across two workers. No financial incentive tied to the workers’ performance is provided to the decision maker.
After the allocation tasks, participants answer belief and motive questions assessing their expectations about how effort responds to different forms of earnings and their stated motivations for their decisions. These questions are designed to shed light on whether choices are driven by social preferences, perceptions of fairness, or beliefs about worker behavior.
This experiment will be compared descriptively to results from a previously run incentivized condition (not part of this pre-registration) to assess how incentives affect allocation behavior.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.