The Political Economy of Progressive Tax Reform. Part 2: Politicians & Bureaucrats

How to cite

Best, Michael; Abbas, Ali; Cheema, Ali; Farooqui, Ahsan; Khan, Adnan; Mohmand, Shandana. 2025. "The Political Economy of Progressive Tax Reform. Part 2: Politicians & Bureaucrats." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016474. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16474-1.0

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Michael Best* , Ali Abbas , Ali Cheema , Ahsan Farooqui , Adnan Khan , Shandana Mohmand

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016474
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16474-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2025-05-01 – 2025-06-30
Countries
Pakistan (Lahore, Punjab)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16474

Abstract

This study aims to trace out the contours of politically feasible property tax reforms. Experiment 1 focused on eliciting citizens' preferences for the level and progressivity of property taxes and their determinants. Experiment 2 focuses on the preferences of local politicians and bureaucrats in the Excise & Taxation department.

Intervention

In our previous experiment, we traced out the determinants of citizens’ policy
preferences. However, there are two other key stakeholders in property tax reforms:
Local politicians, and the bureaucrats who work at the Excise & Taxation department
that administers the tax. This second experiment works with them to understand the
determinants of their preferences and, in particular, how responsive their preferences
are to learning citizens’ preferences.

We do this by randomly providing information about the tax preferences of different stakeholders, namely the owners of low-value properties, the owners of medium-/high-value properties, and the government. We cross randomize this with the provision of information about the compliance rates of different types of households. We then measure the impact on the respondents' preferences over the tax schedule and the property tax reforms that they are willing to endorse.

Experimental design

We randomly assign local politicians to one of five treatment arms and we randomly assign Excise & Taxation bureaucrats to one of four treatment arms. The procedure used is described in detail in the attached pre-analysis plan.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done on a computer using stata.
Randomization unit
individual.
Clusters
1150
Observations
1150
Arms
we expect 202 control observations; 202 observations for four of our treatment arms (containing both bureaucrats and politicians), and 142 for the remaining treatment arm (containing only politicians).
Primary outcomes
We have two primary outcomes: first, The progressivity of the property tax schedule preferred by the respondent. We elicit these through an android app that shows respondents 6 randomly selected properties and elicits responds' preferred tax rates for them. Second, the tax reform the respondent is willing to endorse. We elicit this by asking respondents to fill in and sign a "Policy Recommendations Form".
Secondary outcomes
Please see our attached Pre Analysis Plan for details on all secondary outcomes and how we adjust inference for multiple hypothesis testing.

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Keywords