Sharing losses across time and money

How to cite

Huang, Serena; Velde, Vera te; Faravelli, Marco. 2025. "Sharing losses across time and money." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016472. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16472-1.0

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Serena Huang* , Vera te Velde , Marco Faravelli

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016472
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16472-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-08-20 – 2026-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D03, D64, C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16472

Abstract

The project seeks to answer the question: What explains the time and money asymmetry when sharing losses? We use an experimental framework involving three parts to rigorously test hypotheses derived from existing literature and general observations. We hypothesise that differences in time valuations for self and others as well as social norms are a predictor of this asymmetry. We will investigate this through a laboratory experiment with a 2x2 design: participants will play a monetary dictator game and non-monetary game in either order, and the non-monetary domain will be either waiting time or time spent listening to an aversive tone.

Intervention

The study includes one key experimental intervention: Participants play a monetary dictator game in addition to a dictator game allocating time spent either listening to an aversive tone or waiting passively. Additionally, as a second intervention, the order of these two games will be varied.

Experimental design

Participants are randomly assigned to one of two time treatments (allocated time in the non-monetary dictator game is spent either passively waiting or listening to an aversive tone) and one of two order treatments (the monetary dictator game is played before or after the non-monetary game).

In Part 1, we measure the preference for sharing losses using two dictator games. Each participant is matched to another, and both choose how to split a monetary loss, and then participants are rematched and both similarly choose how to split a time loss. One of the decisions in each pair will be implemented at the end of the experiment to determine the monetary and nonmonetary payoffs.

In Part 2, participants are first required to make a valuation of their minimum willingness to accept a specific duration of the nonmonetary treatment (waiting time or listening to an aversive tone). We elicit WTA for four possible durations - 2, 4, 6, and 8 minutes for the tone treatment, and 6, 12, 18, and 24 minutes for the waiting treatment. The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is used to elicit the true willingness to accept that participants have in relation to the time treatment. Participants are then asked to guess the low, middle and high values of others' valuations, representing the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the distribution of WTA values. One of these guesses across one of the four durations are randomly selected to determine the participant's bonus payment using a binarized scoring rule.

In Part 3, participants first rate the social appropriateness of five potential choices from each of the two dictator games that they played in Part 1. This is followed by participants making an incentivised guess of the percentage of participants that selected a specific rating for a specific action. The aim is to elicit beliefs of social norms, which may play a role in determining the preference for loss sharing across domains. One of these guesses are randomly selected to determine the participant's bonus payment using a binarized scoring rule.

After completing all three parts of the decision-making experiment, participants complete a survey and their payoffs are implemented.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomisation is done in the computer lab by the code algorithm. Assignment to treatments happens on a session-by-session basis.
Randomization unit
Different experimental sessions will be randomly assigned to different treatments, as needed based on enrolment numbers to balance the sample across treatments.
Clusters
8 sessions. More or fewer sessions may be needed to obtain the desired sample size.
Observations
Approximately 160 participants, targetting at least 40 per treatment
Arms
4 sessions (80 participants) in the money and time listening to an aversive tone treatment; 4 sessions (80 students) in the money and waiting time treatment
Primary outcomes
Key outcome variables in this experiment include the allocation decisions of individuals in the dictator game for money and for time (waiting time or time listening to an aversive tone). We are also interested in willingness-to-accept valuations for four possible durations of additional waiting time, and what participants believe is the distribution of willingness-to-accept valuations for others (specifically the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the distribution of WTA values). We also measure social norms ratings of several possible allocation choices in the dictator game variants and incentivized guesses of the percentage of participants that selected each rating for each action.
Secondary outcomes
We additionally collect qualitative survey responses about the importance of several factors to their dictator game allocation decisions.

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Keywords