Acceptance of Getting Transfers and Evading Taxes by fraud or loophole exploitation

How to cite

Mammadli, Shams; Mechtenberg, Lydia; Schmacker, Renke; König, Tobias. 2025. "Acceptance of Getting Transfers and Evading Taxes by fraud or loophole exploitation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016465. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16465-1.0

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Shams Mammadli* , Lydia Mechtenberg , Renke Schmacker , Tobias König

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016465
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16465-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-01-05 – 2026-01-16
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16465

Abstract

This experimental study examines attitudes toward deception and exploitation of loopholes both in a social welfare and in a tax regime. Dishonest actions of participants are observed by impartial spectators, whose normative judgments and sanctioning decisions constitute the main focus of the analysis. The findings are expected to provide insights into how different forms of dishonesty are perceived and what implications these perceptions hold for policy design.

Experimental design

The experiment will consist of two sessions per treatment: player and spectator sessions. Players will perform an activity to earn money. Some players might attempt to earn an additional payout through deception or loophole exploitation. This will be observed by spectators in the second session. They will decide whether or not to sanction these players.
We ran a pilot of this experiment (106 players, 212 spectators) prior to pre-registering the study in order to test the technical implementation. Data from this pilot will not be used for the analysis.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done by a computer
Randomization unit
individual randomization
Clusters
no planned clusters
Observations
300-500 players and 800-1200 spectators
Arms
Session 1: Four player groups with a minimum of 90 players in each Session 2: Four spectator groups with a minimum of 200 participants in each
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome of the analysis will be the sanctioning decisions made by spectators across four treatment groups. We will use parametric and non-parametric tests to evaluate the treatment effects on the propensity to sanction. We will also run a regression analysis with the sanctioning decision as the dependent variable, treatment indicators as the independent variable, and available background variables as controls.
Secondary outcomes
The analysis will also examine the perceived cleverness and appropriateness of the action, perceived honesty of the player, and participants' beliefs about how others evaluate these qualities. Additionally, heterogeneous treatment effects will be analyzed by age, education, income, employment status, and political affiliation. We will also investigate how many participants engage in deception and loophole exploitation, and which predictors are associated with this behavior.

Cited by

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Keywords