Acceptance of Getting Transfers and Evading Taxes by fraud or loophole exploitation
How to cite
Mammadli, Shams; Mechtenberg, Lydia; Schmacker, Renke; König, Tobias. 2025. "Acceptance of Getting Transfers and Evading Taxes by fraud or loophole exploitation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016465. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16465-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This experimental study examines attitudes toward deception and exploitation of loopholes both in a social welfare and in a tax regime. Dishonest actions of participants are observed by impartial spectators, whose normative judgments and sanctioning decisions constitute the main focus of the analysis. The findings are expected to provide insights into how different forms of dishonesty are perceived and what implications these perceptions hold for policy design.
Experimental design
The experiment will consist of two sessions per treatment: player and spectator sessions. Players will perform an activity to earn money. Some players might attempt to earn an additional payout through deception or loophole exploitation. This will be observed by spectators in the second session. They will decide whether or not to sanction these players.
We ran a pilot of this experiment (106 players, 212 spectators) prior to pre-registering the study in order to test the technical implementation. Data from this pilot will not be used for the analysis.
Design details
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