Fraud Detection Under Limited State Capacity: Experimental Evidence From Senegal

How to cite

Czajka, Léo; Sarr, Bassirou; Stein, Mattea. 2025. "Fraud Detection Under Limited State Capacity: Experimental Evidence From Senegal." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016464. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16464-1.0

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Léo Czajka* , Bassirou Sarr , Mattea Stein

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016464
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16464-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-09-01 – 2023-11-15
Countries
Senegal (Africa)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16464

Abstract

Most economic actors -- incorporated firms, self-employed and employees -- in low-income countries are not tax registered and among those registered, non-compliance (under-reporting and failure to declare) is common. Obtaining reliable information on the existence and scope of their economic activities poses complex challenges to tax administrations operating with very limited resources. This study explores how deterring misreporting of third-party data by the largest firms can efficiently help administration to detect tax evasion.

Intervention

By law, tax registered firms in Senegal are required submit to the tax administration the list of all their service suppliers each year in January of year t+1. These lists must include, for each supplier, the name, numerical ID, address, total amount paid and tax withheld (if applicable). We collect all such lists submitted by the large and medium-sized firms in Senegal since 2018. Analyzing the baseline data, we document widespread mis-reporting of identification information: 9 out of 10 firms omit the ID of at least one of its supplier. We then collaborate with the large and medium taxpayers units to implement a wide-reaching enforcement campaign aimed at deterring future misreporting. We then use administrative data submitted after the launch of the enforcement campaign to measure the impact of the intervention.

Experimental design

Our experimental sample consists of all 3,489 firms that have mis-reported supplier lists at least once according the 2018-2020 baseline data. This sample is then split across two groups: one treatment group targeted by the enforcement campaign, and one control group that receives nothing from the experiment.

The enforcement campaign lasts one full year and consists in individualized messages (3 emails in January, May-June, and December 2022 + follow-up verification phone calls after each email). The messages a) indicate that past-misreporting has been detected, b) remind that mis-reporting of lists of suppliers is subject to sanctions and c) urge to do better in the future.

Individualized emails are sent using mail-merge technology, via the communication channels usually used by the tax administration. Phone calls are done by the staff of the communication department of the tax administration.

Taxpayers are not aware of being part of any experiment.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization across treatment and control group was done with the Stata randtreat using 3 strata variable for a total of 32 stratas (STATA version 16.1). The seed number we used was : 973437
Randomization unit
firms only
Clusters
3,489 firms
Observations
3,489 firms
Arms
1743 in the treatment group, 1746 in the control group
Primary outcomes
probability to misreport follow-up suppliers list share of misreported suppliers (i.e with some information missing) share of suppliers flagged as tax evaders
Secondary outcomes
probability to misreport other type of declaration (as a sign of general improvement of declarative compliance) probability to remit the 5% tax to be withheld from transactions to non tax registered suppliers total amount remitted to the tax administration impact on suppliers themselves: probability to declare total revenue declared (because better third-party reporting by the client could deter suppliers from under-reporting)

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Keywords