Interpersonal trust, trust in central banks and central bank communication

How to cite

Dovern, Jonas. 2025. "Interpersonal trust, trust in central banks and central bank communication." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016427. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16427-1.0

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Jonas Dovern*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016427
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16427-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-08-02 – 2026-05-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
E31, E58
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16427

Abstract

This project studies the role that interpersonal trust has on the effectiveness of central bank communication. In particular, I investigate how the effect of providing information about central bank policies on trust in central banks and on inflation expectations varies with the level of interpersonal trust.

I conduct a survey among private households in Germany that elicits interpersonal trust, trust in the central bank and inflation expectations. The survey includes an RCT that provides different information/facts about the central bank’s policy to different treatment groups. I then analyze to what extent heterogeneity of treatment effects on trust in the central bank and inflation expectations can be systematically explained by interpersonal trust.

Intervention

We run a survey experiment using a panel of private households in Germany that is provided by Norstat.

The survey includes the following RCT: The RCT exogenously varies the information about the ECB’s policy that private households see. The first treatment group receives information about the ECB’s mandate/inflation target and a brief explanation of how interest rate policy is used to bring inflation towards the target. The second treatment group receives information about the ECB’s historical track record in terms of the inflation rate since 1999. The third group receives information about both the historical track record and the mandate/inflation target. A control group does not receive any information.

Experimental design

The RCT exogenously varies the information about the ECB’s policy that private households see during the survey. These information treatments are displayed on a separate screen after we elicit priors and before we elicit posteriors. Survey participants are asked to confirm that they have carefully read the provided information.

I use cross-individuals variation to identify the treatment effects.

The survey elicits priors and posteriors for the outcome variables. That allows me to control for priors when analyzing treatment effects or to directly measure the treatment effect on the differences between priors and posteriors.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization is done automatically by drawing random numbers during the execution of the surveys (via Limesurvey).
Randomization unit
Randomization is done at the level of indidivual households who participate in the survey.
Clusters
n.a.
Observations
3,000 private households
Arms
Approximately 750 private households will serve as a control group. The first treatment (information about mandate) will be rolled out to approximately 750 private households. The second treatment (/information about historical performance) will be rolled out to approximately 1,000 private households. The final treatment will be rolled out to approximately 500 private households.
Primary outcomes
inflation expectations (with expectation horizons of 12 and 24 months; in percent), assessment of likelihood of reaching inflation target in the medium term (0-10), general trust in central bank (0-10), trust in rule- and science-based ECB policy (0-10).
Secondary outcomes
Narratives about distrust in central bank

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Keywords