Climate-induced economic risks and cooperative behavior: An experimental analysis
How to cite
Traub, Stefan; Berlemann, Michael; Roggenkamp, Hauke. 2025. "Climate-induced economic risks and cooperative behavior: An experimental analysis." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016401. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16401-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In this project, we experimentally investigate whether aleatoric uncertainty influences voluntary contribution behavior in a dynamic public goods game. The basis for this is the experiment by Gächter et al. (2017, JPubE), in which dynamic dependence between the rounds of the game is created by making the payouts from the previous round the initial endowments for the current round. While Gächter et al. (2017) focus on the effect of punishment on contribution behavior, this project introduces risk to mimic climate-related damage. In each round, there is a certain probability that an (extreme weather) event will occur, which, depending on previous investment in the public good, causes a certain amount of damage in the form of destruction of the initial endowment. The experimental design is such that both treatments (with and without extreme-weather events) are strategically equivalent for players seeking to maximize their own payoffs.
Intervention
There are two between-subjects treatments, baseline and uncertainty.
Baseline: Groups of 4 players play the dynamic public goods game as described in Gächter et al. (2017). At the beginning of each round, players decide individually and anonymously how much of their initial endowment to invest in the public good. At the end of the round, players receive feedback and their individual payoffs become their initial endowment for the next round. The game ends after 10 rounds.
Uncertainty: Same as baseline, but with a 20% probability that an event destroys between 0% and 50% of the payout. The amount of damage depends on the group investment in the public good; the higher the investment, the lower the damage.
Strategic equivalence: The marginal per capita return (MPCR) is modified in the Uncertainty Treatment so that its expected value is identical to that of the Baseline Treatment.
The two rounds in the uncertainty treatment in which the event occurs are the same for all participants and are drawn in advance.
Experimental design
Each round is a standard public goods game with the payoff function
N_(i,t+1)=N_(i,t)-c_(i,t)+MPCR_(i,t)*sum_(j) c_(j,t)-D_(i,t)
N_(i,t+1) is the payoff of round t for player i which become the initial endowment of round t+1.
N_(i,t) is the initial endowment (which is the same for all player in period 1).
c_(i,t) is his contribution to the public good.
MPCR_(i,t) is the marginal per capita return. In Baseline, it is simply 1.5/4 (4 is the group size). In Uncertainty, it is (1.5/4-p*delta*N_(i,t)/sum_(k)N_(k,t)), where p=0.2 is the ex-ante probability of an extreme event and delta=0.5 is the size of the damage.
D_(i,t) is the expected individual damage. D_(i,t)=p*f_(t)*d_{i,t], where f_(t) is the damage factor (1-sum_{j,t}*c_{j,t}/sum_{j,t}N_{j,t}) and d_(i,t) is the individual maximum damage delta*N_{i,t}.
In each round group members simultaneously and anonymously submit their individual contributions c_(i,t)s. At the end of the round, feedback is given. In the Uncertainty Treatment, an event may occur that destroys up to half of the payoff. The payoff of the current round becomes the endowment of the next round. After 10 rounds the game ends and participants receive their payoffs.
We also elicit subjects' risk attitudes and socio-demographic data.
Design details
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