Peer Information and Incentives in the Gig Economy
How to cite
Lim, Zhi Hao. 2025. "Peer Information and Incentives in the Gig Economy." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016393. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16393-2.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Peer information is pervasive in the workplace, but recent work shows that workers differ in how they value and respond to it (Lim, 2025). We conduct a field experiment with rideshare drivers to study demand for peer earnings information and identify the mechanisms behind it. Drivers are randomly assigned to one of three information treatments: no peer information, peer information, or an endogenous choice condition. Over the intervention period, they are also assigned all three incentive conditions: no bonus, a target-based bonus, and a proportional bonus, with the order randomized. Using administrative records and survey responses, we examine heterogeneity in information demand and labor supply responses across treatment arms. We benchmark the effects of peer information against financial incentives, examine potential interaction effects, and additionally provide experimental estimates of labor supply elasticities leveraging on exogenous variation in wages.
Intervention
Refer to experimental design.
Experimental design
Drivers are randomly assigned to one of three information treatment groups:
1. No Info group: Drivers receive only their own earnings updates each week.
2. Info group: Drivers receive both their own earnings and peer group earnings updates each week.
3. Endogenous Info group: Drivers receive their own earnings updates each week; whether they also receive peer earnings updates depends on their stated preferences.
In addition to the information treatments (whose assignments are fixed throughout), each driver faces three different incentive conditions over the intervention period. These are:
A. No Incentive: No additional bonuses are provided.
B. Target Incentive: Drivers receive a bonus of $X for completing Y trips on a specified day.
C. Multiplier Incentive: Drivers earn an additional Z% bonus on their total earnings on a specified day.
(X, Y, and Z are placeholders that are calibrated based on the company's current incentive structure.)
Each incentive condition lasts for one week, and the order of incentives is randomized for each driver.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.