How civil society sustain cooperation for public goods where the state is weak? We answer this question by working in partnership with Kananga’s city administration (Kasai-Central, DRC) to reform salongo, a local institution for public good provision. Through randomized variation in leadership presence, group composition, and monitoring technologies, we test how traditional and religious leaders mobilize participation and sustain effort. A complementary survey experiment explores how stochastic shocks and narratives shape beliefs about divine accountability, advancing theory on cooperation and norm enforcement in fragile states.
Intervention
This study evaluates whether trusted local leaders (religious or traditional) can mobilize collective action in fragile settings by activating norms of reciprocity. In partnership with the city administration of Kananga, DRC, we embed a field experiment within a new initiative to revitalize salongo. As part of this program, residents are placed into small accountability groups whose contributions to public works—labor, materials, or money—are tracked through a new digital system. These groups meet regularly to review participation and are informed that the most active team will receive a symbolic recognition award at the end of the month. The experiment leverages this policy structure—advanced by the city administration, our implementing partner—to randomly vary two dimensions: (i) whether a religious leader, a traditional leader, or no leader attends the meetings; and (ii) whether groups are composed of participants from the same ethnic background or different ethnic groups (see PAP 1).
On the top of the field experiment, we introduce a survey experiment where we investigate how stochastic shocks and narratives shape beliefs about moral supernatural forces. Depending on a contingent state of nature, outside the control of researchers, survey payments on recurring meetings may be attached to the free-riding behavior of participants. In one state of nature, the 'Justice' state, outcomes simulate the actions of a moral god, where cooperators (those who contributed a higher share of labor and resources to community projects) receive a higher payment than free-riders. In the alternative state, the 'Neutrality' state, survey payments are the same. This cross‑randomization forms a distinct 2 × 3 factorial survey experiment—crossing the shock condition (Justice vs Neutrality) with the three leadership treatments—and allows us to identify whether trusted authorities amplify, dampen, or leave unchanged the behavioural and belief responses to moralized randomness (see PAP 2).
Experimental design
We conduct a series of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to study how informal accountability mechanisms sustain cooperation in contexts of weak state presence. Our experiments take place in Kananga, Democratic Republic of Congo, and build on partnerships with local authorities and civil society.
The umbrella project covers two complementary studies:
- Study 1: We randomize the presence of local leaders (religious and traditional leaders), the social composition of accountability groups (ethnically homogeneous or mixed), and the availability of granular information on participation to test how informal accountability channels (expectations of social reciprocity and beliefs in divine reciprocity) affect collective action. Outcomes include cooperation in community labor activities and beliefs about social and supernatural reciprocity.
- Study 2: We introduce randomized shocks to group earnings, designed to mimic real-world stochastic events (e.g., rainfall), and observe how participants and leaders interpret these shocks. By exploring variations on lottery framing, timing, and group composition, we test whether narratives of divine justice around stochastic payoffs shape cooperation in public goods provision.
The experimental design in both studies follows a factorial structure. The primary purpose is to test how informal institutions mobilize cooperative behavior and how narratives about fairness or divine justice sustain that behavior in the face of uncertainty. See Pre-Analysis Plans for more information.
Design details
Randomization method
Computer Randomization in R; Rain occurrence.
Randomization unit
Accountability groups
Clusters
480 accountability groups
Observations
The intervention counts with 4 participants per group, totaling 1,920 meeting slots in the main specification.
-Out of the 1,920 participation slots. 320 are taken by 80 leaders that participate in 4 slots each.
-1,600 citizens take part in the remaining slots.
-The main analysis will be done with those 1,600 individuals
560 other citizens in control conditions (do not participate in accountability meetings).
- 240 controls in pure control neighborhoods
- 320 controls in treated neighborhoods
Observations for individuals in treated neighborhoods will follow a panel structure. Administrative records from the community contributions tracking system will allow the analysis of 29 time periods per individual in treated neighborhoods (4 weeks with tracking from monday-saturday, 1 week with tracking from monday-friday). Thus we expect to have a panel of 58,000 individual-time observations (1,600 citizens + 80 leaders + 320 citizens tracked in control conditions = 2,000 tracked individuals in the panel of 29 time periods).
Baseline/Endline surveys will count with 2,240 observations (2,000 treated neighborhood individuals + 240 pure control neighborhood individuals).
Arms
Design 1 (see PAP for details):
- Religious leader, homogeneous group, visible individual contributions: 40 groups
- Religious leader, heterogeneous group, visible individual contributions: 40 groups
- Traditional leader, homogeneous group, visible individual contributions: 40 groups
- Traditional leader, heterogeneous group, visible individual contributions: 40 groups
- No leader, homogeneous group, visible individual contributions:: 40 groups
- No leader, heterogeneous group, visible individual contributions:: 40 groups
- Religious leader, homogeneous group, individual contributions not visible: 40 groups
- Religious leader, heterogeneous group, individual contributions not visible: 40 groups
- Traditional leader, homogeneous group, individual contributions not visible: 40 groups
- Traditional leader, heterogeneous group, individual contributions not visible: 40 groups
- No leader, homogeneous group, individual contributions not visible: 40 groups
- No leader, heterogeneous group, individual contributions not visible: 40 groups
Design 2 (see PAP for details):
- Main arm -- Rain framing for shock (28 neighborhoods, 12 groups per neighborhood, 336 groups):
- Religious leader, 'divine' shock, payments before meeting: 28 groups
- Religious leader, 'divine' shock, payments after meeting: 28 groups
- Religious leader, no shock, payments before meeting: 28 groups
- Religious leader, no shock, payments after meeting: 28 groups
- Traditional leader, 'divine' shock, payments before meeting: 28 groups
- Traditional leader, 'divine' shock, payments after meeting: 28 groups
- Traditional leader, no shock, payments before meeting: 28 groups
- Traditional leader, no shock, payments after meeting: 28 groups
- No leader, 'divine' shock, payments before meeting: 28 groups
- No leader, 'divine' shock, payments after meeting: 28 groups
- No leader, no shock, payments before meeting: 28 groups
- No leader, no shock, payments after meeting: 28 groups
- Placebo arm -- Tablet framing for shock (12 neighborhoods, 12 groups per neighborhood, 144 groups):
- Religious leader, 'divine' shock, payments before meeting: 24 groups
- Religious leader, no shock, payments before meeting: 24 groups
- Traditional leader, 'divine' shock, payments before meeting: 24 groups
- Traditional leader, no shock, payments before meeting: 24 groups
- No leader, 'divine' shock, payments before meeting: 24 groups
- No leader, no shock, payments before meeting: 24 groups
Primary outcomes
Voluntary contributions to community projects:
- Labor contributions, extensive margin per day.
- Labor contributions, intensive margin per day: hours and minutes worked.
- Cash contributions, extensive margin per day.
- Cash contributions, intensive margin per day: Congolese Francs contributed.
- Material contributions, extensive margin per day.
- Material contributions, intensive margin per day: estimated value of goods contributed.
Secondary outcomes
Survey measures on:
- Expectations of social reciprocity.
- Beliefs in divine reciprocity.
- Self-reported community enforcement behavior.
- Dyadic measures of interactions and social expectations of with accountability group peers.
Transcription of accountability meetings recordings:
- Minutes spoken during accountability meetings.
- Frequency of key words pronounced in meetings.
- Human-based and AI based analysis of meeting content.
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