In settings where formal contract enforcement is limited, sellers often rely on alternative, non-contractual mechanisms to assure buyers of product quality. We document the use of culturally embedded signals that serve as informal commitment devices in trade interactions. Using a series of field experiments, we assess the prevalence of such commitments and examine the extent to which they are effective.
Intervention
To preserve the integrity of the experiment, the intervention will remain concealed until the study is completed.
Experimental design
To preserve the integrity of the experiment, the experimental design will remain concealed until the study is completed.
Design details
Randomization method
Randomization is done by a computer.
Randomization unit
seller-day-session
Clusters
We have recruited 26 sellers.
Observations
9360 Sale Volume (26 sellers*36 days*2 sessions*5 items)
Arms
The experiment includes two interventions at each seller-day-session. At a given seller-day-session, the seller is randomly instructed to refrain from using religious oaths during their interactions with customers. Additionally, we randomize whether a poster is displayed on the street where the seller is located during that session. Therefore, we expect to have 2,340 sales volume observations in each of the four treatment arms:
1. No instruction, no poster
2. No instruction, poster displayed
3. Instruction to refrain from oaths, no poster
4. Instruction to refrain from oaths, poster displayed
Primary outcomes
Sales volume (measured in 100-gram units for items sold in bulk, and in number of packages for items sold in factory-packaged format)
Cited by
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