Insuring home from afar: Experimental evidence on migrants’ demand for weather index insurance
How to cite
Gasten, Anna; Kis-Katos, Krisztina. 2026. "Insuring home from afar: Experimental evidence on migrants’ demand for weather index insurance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016266. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16266-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study examines how rural-to-urban migrants in Thailand and Vietnam manage agricultural risk for their origin households, and how existing informal risk-sharing mechanisms (remittances) are influenced by formal financial products, such as weather-indexed insurance. We implement a within-subject experimental design in which migrants are offered three financial decision scenarios: (1) an immediate remittance transfer to their household, (2) an index insurance product that pays out to the household in the event of extreme weather, and (3) a savings product that disburses to the household after a fixed period. Choices are incentivized with a Random Incentive System (RIS). The experiment also elicits hypothetical remittance adjustments under two scenarios—whether the household is uninsured or hypothetically insured—allowing us to study the substitutability or complementarity between formal insurance and informal transfers. Additionally, randomized between-subject framing variation tests whether describing the product as a “protection product” rather than “insurance” increases uptake, given low trust in insurance companies, due to past fraud scandals. The study leverages rich longitudinal TVSEP data to analyze uptake, behavioral motives, and heterogeneous responses, providing insights into formal and informal mechanisms for household risk management.
Intervention
This study examines whether rural–to-urban migrants are willing to take up formal, weather-indexed financial products on behalf of their rural origin households, and how such products interact with existing informal risk-sharing arrangements such as remittances. The intervention targets migrants residing in urban locations who originate from agricultural households that are exposed to climate-related risks, including droughts and floods.
Smallholder households in developing countries frequently rely on informal insurance mechanisms—most notably financial support from migrant family members (“remittances”) —to cope with agricultural income (weather) shocks. While such transfers play an important role in household risk management, they may be unreliable under covariate shocks and can place substantial financial pressure on migrants. Formal agricultural insurance offers a potential alternative, but uptake remains persistently low. Beyond high costs, limited trust in insurers, and high discounting of future payment, one substantial reason may be that households perceive themselves as sufficiently insured by their family network, notably migrants.
This creates externalities for urban migrants: they act as de facto risk-bearers for their rural households but are often not formally involved in insurance adoption decisions. The present intervention seeks to explore how migrants make choices about taking up formal, weather-indexed insurance for their origin households through a set of experimentally structured financial decisions. Specifically, the study investigates (i) how migrants’ uptake of insurance is related to migrant, household, and migrant–household dyad characteristics, including past exposure to shocks, socio-demographics, interlinkages between the household and migrant, and past integration in the financial system; (ii) how time preferences, altruistic motives, and risk perceptions shape financial decisions; (iii) how formal insurance interacts with existing informal support mechanisms, such as remittances; and (iv) whether uptake is influenced by trust in insurance providers and by alternative product framings (“insurance” versus “protection product”).
The intervention is conducted within a migrant tracking survey that is part of the long-running TVSEP panel in Thailand and Vietnam. Eligible participants are adult rural–urban migrants whose households of origin reside in six rural provinces across the two countries and who were interviewed during the 2024 household wave (and in most cases in multiple prior waves of the 18-year-long panel). During the migrant interviews in 2025/2026, respondents are presented with a series of structured financial decision scenarios involving real monetary stakes (via a Random Incentive System). These scenarios allow migrants to allocate a lump-sum endowment either to themselves or toward financial products that benefit their rural household.
A central component of the intervention is an offer to purchase a weather-indexed, insurance-like product for the migrant’s household of origin. If selected and taken up, the product pays out automatically to the household in the event of an extreme weather shock occurring in the household’s village within a 6-month future period. Weather shocks are measured using a publicly available, objective precipitation–evapotranspiration index (SPEI-6), ensuring transparent and verifiable trigger conditions. The product is designed to provide protection against both drought and excessive rainfall, depending on local climatic conditions.
In addition to the insurance offer, migrants are asked to make comparable decisions involving an immediate transfer to the household and a delayed but guaranteed savings payout to the household. These additional options provide benchmarks to understand how migrants value immediate support, future certainty, and contingent risk protection when making financial decisions for their families.
To ensure incentive compatibility while managing the long-term panel structure of TVSEP, only a randomly selected subset of respondents and decision scenarios are implemented with real financial payouts. All participants are informed about the random selection process before making their choices, and are told at the end of the survey whether they have been selected for a payout. Clear explanations and comprehension checks are used to ensure respondents understand the nature of the products, the payout conditions, and the timing of any transfers.
In addition to the incentivized decision tasks, migrants report the amount of remittances they would send back to their rural household under two hypothetical scenarios: (a) the household experiences a shock and is insured, or (b) the household experiences a shock but is not insured. The order of these scenarios is randomly varied.
The study also includes a framing variation to test whether trust and perceptions influence uptake. Migrants are randomly assigned to receive the same weather-indexed product described either using standard “insurance” terminology or using neutral language that frames the product as a weather “protection product,” while keeping all contractual features identical.
By directly involving migrants in formal risk management decisions for their origin households, the intervention aims to assess (i) the willingness of migrants to purchase insurance-like products, (ii) behavioral trade-offs in the decision to purchase insurance products for the household; (iii) how formal insurance interacts with informal remittance-based support, and (iv) whether trust and framing affect demand. While implemented in the context of rural–urban migration in Southeast Asia, the intervention speaks more broadly to settings where informal family networks play a central role in coping with economic risk and where formal insurance markets face persistent adoption barriers.
Experimental design
The intervention leverages the long-running TVSEP migrant tracking survey to implement a multi-component, incentive-compatible experiment on migrants’ financial choices and demand for weather risk protection. The design is tailored to uncover how migrants trade off their own consumption, support to their origin households, and formal insurance. The intervention further allows analysis of whether formal insurance and informal support through remittances act as substitutes or complements, and whether framing and trust-related perceptions influence migrants’ willingness to allocate resources to formal weather risk protection.
(1) At the core of the design are three incentivized financial decision tasks: an immediate transfer, a delayed transfer (savings product), and a weather-indexed product. The order of these tasks is randomly assigned to each respondent to mitigate ordering effects and to enable within-person comparisons across different financial contexts.
(2) To ensure incentive compatibility, the study employs a random incentive system in which a subset of respondents (20 per country) is randomly selected to receive real monetary payouts based on one of their decisions from step (1), with insurance-related payouts determined ex post by realized weather outcomes. This maintains a meaningful probability that any given choice is payoff-relevant, while limiting financial expenditures and avoiding spillovers to the ongoing household panel survey.
(3) Beyond these incentivized choices, migrants state hypothetical remittance amounts under two scenarios—household shock with insurance and household shock without insurance—with the scenario order again being randomized to avoid systematic ordering effects.
(4) A key treatment concerns how the weather-indexed product is described. Migrants are randomly assigned to see the same contract presented either with standard “insurance” terminology or as a neutral “weather protection product,” with price, trigger, and payout features held constant to isolate the causal effect of terminology and perceived trust on uptake.
Combining randomization over task order, framing, and payout selection generates exogenous variation that supports estimation of framing effects on uptake, the impact of insurance availability on expected remittances (link between formal and informal insurance mechanisms), and the relationship between preferences and behavior across tasks.
Design details
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