Responsiveness of Public Administration to Behavioral Appeals - Evidence From a Field Experiment in Germany

How to cite

Doerrenberg, Philipp; Blesse, Sebastian; Asatryan, Zareh. 2016. "Responsiveness of Public Administration to Behavioral Appeals - Evidence From a Field Experiment in Germany." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001623. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1623-3.0

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Philipp Doerrenberg* , Sebastian Blesse , Zareh Asatryan

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001623
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1623-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2016-10-03 – 2017-09-27
Countries
Private
JEL codes
H7, H8, D73
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1623

Abstract

How responsive are public administration institutions to different types of "behavioral" appeals? To study this question, we run a field experiment with public administrations in Germany. We write letters to all local-level tax authorities which include a request by our research institution to share non-confidential data for research purposes. The data-request letters embed a field experiment with four different groups in order to study if public administrations are responsive to some of the most common types of “behavioral” appeals: social norms, shaming and deterrence. In the social norm treatment, we inform tax authorities about the fact that we already received data from a non-negligible number of tax authorities. In the shaming treatment, we inform that the resulting research publication will include information about which tax authorities provided data. In the deterrence treatment, we refer to a public freedom-of- information law in Germany which requires public administrations to share data. A control group receives a neutral letter. This field experiment adds to an understanding if behavioral appeals, that have frequently been shown to be effective with individuals, also affect behavior of administrations and it adds to an understanding of the interaction between citizens and public adminsitrations.

Intervention

Letters with different statements: In the social norm treatment, we inform tax authorities about the fact that we already received data from a non-negligible number of tax authorities. In the shaming treatment, we inform that the resulting research publication will include information about which tax authorities provided data. In the deterrence treatment, we refer to a public freedom-of- information law in Germany which requires public administrations to share data. A control group receives a neutral letter.

Experimental design

see Abstract and Intervention

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Local tax authorities at the city level
Clusters
450 different cities
Observations
Some (not all) cities have several tax authorities. All authorities in the same city are in the same treatment group. Number of tax authorities: 615
Arms
Control group: 111 clusters, 163 obs Shaming: 113 clusters, 144 obs Social Norms: 113 clusters , 131 obs Deterrence: 113 clusters, 177 obs
Primary outcomes
Responsiveness yes/no, date of responsiveness, data provision yes/no, amount of data provided yes/no

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords