Agent Incentives to Maximize Profits and Social Welfare from a Catastrophic Drought Insurance?
How to cite
Morsink, Karlijn; Zhao, Hongdi. 2025. "Agent Incentives to Maximize Profits and Social Welfare from a Catastrophic Drought Insurance?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016218. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16218-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
While the demand for and design of index insurance products has been extensively
studied, there is limited understanding of how incentives for agents that promote insurance
influence demand and consumer welfare. This paper explores the optimal
incentive structures for insurance agents in the context of a public-private partnership
where insurers’ objectives are to maximize profits and government’s objectives are
to maximizes social welfare. We implement a cluster randomized control-trial where
agents are randomly assigned to sales, renewal and consumer knowledge incentives.
We investigate the effect of these incentives on insurance take-up, insurance renewals,
and consumer knowledge.
Experimental design
The insurance-based financial product that we study is a catastrophic drought insurance. The program through which this product is delivered is a public-private partnership between the government and a regional re-insurer that partners with insurance companies
that underwrite the catastrophic drought risk. The regional re-insurer engages with insurance
agents who are responsible for the promotion and sales of the product.
For the research, we identified 393 communities where agents are actively promoting and selling the product in the
upcoming seasons. We randomize communities into alternative incentive structures that
vary whether agents receive additional sales incentives, renewal incentives, and consumer
knowledge incentives.
Design details
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