Endogenous Horizon Information Choices in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

How to cite

Zou, Wenbo. 2025. "Endogenous Horizon Information Choices in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016185. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16185-1.1

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Wenbo Zou*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016185
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16185-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-09-01 – 2026-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C72, C73, C92.
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16185

Abstract

We investigate whether individuals choose to forego horizon information when its availability is endogenously determined in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. Theoretically, avoiding horizon information preserves the structure of an indefinitely repeated game—rather than a finitely repeated one—thereby potentially supporting cooperative equilibrium. We test this prediction in a laboratory experiment that also includes exogenous finite and indefinite treatments for comparisons.

Intervention

The intervention concerns the availability of horizon information in repeated prisoner's dilemma.

Experimental design

We adopt a between-subject design of four treatments that differ in the availability of horizon information: the (exogenously) Finite treatment, the (exogenously) Indefinite treatment, and two endogenous treatments.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Experimental sessions.
Clusters
16 experimental sessions.
Observations
272 laboratory participants.
Arms
68 laboratory participants in each treatment.
Primary outcomes
Information acquisition choices, and cooperation in repeated game.
Secondary outcomes
Beliefs that the other player chooses to cooperate in the first round.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords