Endogenous Horizon Information Choices in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
How to cite
Zou, Wenbo. 2025. "Endogenous Horizon Information Choices in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016185. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16185-1.1
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
We investigate whether individuals choose to forego horizon information when its availability is endogenously determined in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. Theoretically, avoiding horizon information preserves the structure of an indefinitely repeated game—rather than a finitely repeated one—thereby potentially supporting cooperative equilibrium. We test this prediction in a laboratory experiment that also includes exogenous finite and indefinite treatments for comparisons.
Intervention
The intervention concerns the availability of horizon information in repeated prisoner's dilemma.
Experimental design
We adopt a between-subject design of four treatments that differ in the availability of horizon information: the (exogenously) Finite treatment, the (exogenously) Indefinite treatment, and two endogenous treatments.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.