Deterring moral hazard in social insurance: Experimental evidence from doctors’ leave prescription
How to cite
Celhay, Pablo. 2025. "Deterring moral hazard in social insurance: Experimental evidence from doctors’ leave prescription." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016184. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16184-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study implements a randomized controlled trial (RCT) to evaluate the behavioral response of high-prescribing physicians to automated notifications regarding their issuance of medical leave certificates in Chile. The intervention targets approximately 1,500 physicians identified as the top 2–3% emitters of medical licenses based on data from 2019–2021. The sample was stratified by baseline volume of license issuance and medical specialty, and randomly allocated into three groups: a control group and two treatment arms. Over an 11-month period (February–December 2022), physicians received real-time "pop-up" notifications through the IMED electronic license issuance platform. Treatment Group 1 received informational messages about their relative position in the national distribution of license issuers. Treatment Group 2 received similar messages with the addition of a warning regarding potential auditing, referencing relevant legal frameworks. The control group received no notifications. The study uses administrative records from FONASA, including the complete universe of medical licenses issued electronically or by paper from 2018 to 2022. Data include variables such as diagnosis code, encrypted physician and patient IDs, issuance date, and duration. Additional datasets provided demographic and professional information for balance checks and heterogeneity analyses. To estimate treatment effects, the empirical strategy involves fixed-effects panel regressions at the physician-month level, clustering standard errors at the randomization block level. The primary outcomes include the total number of licenses issued and days granted. The analysis also includes dynamic specifications to examine monthly treatment effects over time, and subgroup analyses based on diagnosis categories and physician characteristics.
Intervention
The intervention aimed to reduce excessive issuance of medical leave certificates by high-prescribing physicians in Chile’s public health insurance system (FONASA), using behavioral nudges delivered through existing digital infrastructure. It consisted of real-time, automated notifications integrated into an electronic platform used by physicians to issue medical licenses.
The intervention targeted approximately 1,500 physicians identified as the top 2–3% emitters of licenses from 2019 to 2021. Physicians were stratified by baseline issuance volume and specialty, then randomly assigned into one of three groups:
Control group: No intervention.
Treatment group 1 (Information message): Upon issuing their first license of the day, physicians received a pop-up notification stating their cumulative number of licenses issued in the year and their national percentile ranking.
Treatment group 2 (Information + regulatory warning): Physicians received the same notification as group 1, but with an added legal warning stating that their behavior could trigger an audit under existing health regulations (Art. 21 of DS 3 and Law 20.585).
Notifications were delivered daily and updated dynamically with new license counts, while percentile rankings remained fixed due to logistical constraints. The messages were intended to leverage social comparison and perceived regulatory oversight to influence prescribing behavior. The intervention was implemented for 11 months, from February to December 2022, without altering physicians’ ability to issue licenses or their clinical autonomy.
Experimental design
This study uses a randomized controlled trial (RCT) to evaluate the impact of digital behavioral nudges on the issuance of medical leave certificates by high-emitting physicians in Chile's public health insurance system (FONASA).
Sample and Randomization:
The intervention targeted approximately 1,500 physicians identified as the top 2–3% emitters of medical licenses based on administrative data from 2019–2021. The sample was stratified by specialty and baseline license volume, then randomly assigned to one of three groups (n ≈ 500 per group):
Control Group: No notification.
Treatment Group 1 (Information Message): Received a daily pop-up notification via the IMED platform with their cumulative number of licenses issued in the year and their percentile ranking nationally.
Treatment Group 2 (Information + Regulatory Warning): Received the same notification as Group 1, with an added warning about potential audit under Chilean health regulations.
Intervention Period:
The intervention was implemented for 11 months, from February to December 2022. Notifications were triggered upon the physician’s first license issuance of the day.
Data and Measurement:
Outcomes are measured using administrative data from FONASA, covering all electronic and paper-issued medical licenses. The primary endpoints include the total number of licenses issued, total days granted, and average days per license. Additional data are used to verify balance across groups and assess heterogeneous effects by diagnosis and physician characteristics.
This design allows for causal identification of the impact of informational and regulatory messages on physician behavior within a high-frequency, real-world digital environment.
Design details
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