Contributions, threats, and bargaining.
How to cite
Nicholas, Aaron; Feltovich, Nick. 2025. "Contributions, threats, and bargaining.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016162. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16162-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Experimental economists have sought to understand how people negotiate, and what outcomes are likely to occur. In a simple bargaining setting, two people have a fixed amount to bargain over (the 'cake'), and they know what each will receive if bargaining is unsuccessful ('disagreement payoffs'). Bargaining power comes from many sources, two of which are: (a) differences in the disagreement payoffs, or (b) differences in what each contributes to the cake. We seek to understand which of (a) and (b) has the larger effect on bargaining behaviour and bargaining outcomes.
Intervention
Contribution treatment (baseline)
Real effort stage:
Participants complete a real effort task. They are told that better performance in the real effort task will “improve some conditions” in the next stage of the interaction.
Bargaining stage:
Participants are split into ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ based on their performance. Winners are matched with losers to form pairs.
The winner and loser are endowed with X1 and X2, with the bargaining pie being (X1+X2)*2, and X1>X2.
Disagreement payoffs are determined by a coin flip, with Heads leading to X1 and X2 for the winner and loser respectively, and Tails leading to X2 and X1.
Bargaining occurs through a Nash Demand Game.
Threat treatment
Real effort stage:
Identical to baseline.
Bargaining stage:
Participants are split into ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ based on their performance. Winners are matched with losers to form pairs.
Contributions/endowments are determined by a coin flip, with Heads leading to X1 and X2 for the winner and loser respectively, and Tails leading to X2 and X1, with and X1>X2. The bargaining pie remains (X1+X2)*2.
Disagreement payoffs X1 for winners and X2 for losers.
Bargaining occurs through a Nash Demand Game.
Treatments differ by the coupling of real effort to contributions, versus threats.
Experimental design
Refer to intervention section.
Design details
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