Contributions, threats, and bargaining.

How to cite

Nicholas, Aaron; Feltovich, Nick. 2025. "Contributions, threats, and bargaining.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016162. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16162-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Aaron Nicholas* , Nick Feltovich

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016162
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16162-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-06-04 – 2025-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C78; D90
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16162

Abstract

Experimental economists have sought to understand how people negotiate, and what outcomes are likely to occur. In a simple bargaining setting, two people have a fixed amount to bargain over (the 'cake'), and they know what each will receive if bargaining is unsuccessful ('disagreement payoffs'). Bargaining power comes from many sources, two of which are: (a) differences in the disagreement payoffs, or (b) differences in what each contributes to the cake. We seek to understand which of (a) and (b) has the larger effect on bargaining behaviour and bargaining outcomes.

Intervention

Contribution treatment (baseline)

Real effort stage:
Participants complete a real effort task. They are told that better performance in the real effort task will “improve some conditions” in the next stage of the interaction.

Bargaining stage:
Participants are split into ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ based on their performance. Winners are matched with losers to form pairs.
The winner and loser are endowed with X1 and X2, with the bargaining pie being (X1+X2)*2, and X1>X2.
Disagreement payoffs are determined by a coin flip, with Heads leading to X1 and X2 for the winner and loser respectively, and Tails leading to X2 and X1.
Bargaining occurs through a Nash Demand Game.

Threat treatment

Real effort stage:
Identical to baseline.

Bargaining stage:
Participants are split into ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ based on their performance. Winners are matched with losers to form pairs.
Contributions/endowments are determined by a coin flip, with Heads leading to X1 and X2 for the winner and loser respectively, and Tails leading to X2 and X1, with and X1>X2. The bargaining pie remains (X1+X2)*2.
Disagreement payoffs X1 for winners and X2 for losers.
Bargaining occurs through a Nash Demand Game.

Treatments differ by the coupling of real effort to contributions, versus threats.

Experimental design

Refer to intervention section.

Design details

Randomization method
Recruitment through Prolific.
Randomization unit
Prolific’s demographic balancing feature will be used to ensure a 50/50 split between male and female participants. Participants are restricted to having completed high school and being between 18—60 years old.
Clusters
Not clustered.
Observations
600 Prolific Participants
Arms
300 per treatment.
Primary outcomes
In the event of Tails, conflict between contributions and threats occur. Our main analysis involves checking, in the event of a Tails coin toss, whether bargaining parties who have the higher contribution, versus parties who have the higher threat, submit higher claims and receive greater shares of the pie.
Secondary outcomes
Our secondary analysis involves checking whether the results for the main analysis differ across treatments; i.e. whether real-effort’s coupling to contributions versus threats makes a difference.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords