The Impact of Microfinance on Social Capital and Female Empowerment in India

How to cite

Feigenberg, Benjamin; Rigol, Natalia; Sarkar, Shayak; Field, Erica; Pande, Rohini. 2016. "The Impact of Microfinance on Social Capital and Female Empowerment in India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001613. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1613-1.0

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Benjamin Feigenberg* , Natalia Rigol , Shayak Sarkar , Erica Field , Rohini Pande

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001613
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1613-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2006-04-01 – 2014-06-10
Countries
India (Kolkata, West Bengal)
JEL codes
C81, C93, O12, O16
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1613

Abstract

Recent research suggests that more frequent meeting can increase social capital among microfinance clients. Using random assignment of first-time borrowers to either weekly or monthly repayment groups as well as a later public goods experiment, the researchers demonstrate that borrowers assigned to weekly repayment groups interact more often and exhibit a higher willingness to pool risk with group members from their first loan cycle nearly two years after the experiment. They were also three times less likely to default on their loan. In a second intervention, the researchers find that social capital gains associated with more frequent meeting accrue across multiple lending cycles for new and existing borrowers, but the effects are heterogeneous.

Intervention

The researchers evaluated two interventions to examine the effect of the frequency of microfinance group meetings on social capital formation, informal risk sharing, default rate, and female empowerment. In the first intervention, 100 lending groups of first-time borrowers were randomized into three experimental arms where lending groups met to make loan payments monthly (control), weekly (first treatment), and a third that met weekly but repaid monthly (second treatment). In this intervention, the researchers examined the effects of weekly meetings vs. monthly meetings on social interaction, willingness to pool risk, and default rate with borrowers in monthly meetings as the control group.

In the second intervention, 148 loan groups were randomized into two experimental arms: the control arm with a monthly repayment schedule and the treatment arm with a weekly repayment schedule. The participants included first-time borrowers and repeat borrowers. In this intervention, the researchers examined the effects of weekly meetings vs. monthly meetings on long term social capital formation and female empowerment. The researchers also investigated heterogeneity of treatment effects.

Experimental design

In the first intervention, 100 lending groups of all new borrowers were randomized into 3 experimental arms. The control group was made up of 38 lending groups which met monthly to make loan payments. The first treatment group was made up of 30 lending groups which met weekly to make loan payments. The second treatment group was made up of 32 lending groups which met weekly but made loan payments monthly. After the first loan cycle, all lending groups switched to a biweekly meeting and repayment schedule. Data collection consisted of a pre-disbursement baseline survey, an endline survey thirteen months after initial disbursement, monthly surveys collected at group meetings, and a lottery experiment intended to measure risk sharing.

In the second intervention, 148 lending groups of new and old borrowers were randomized into two experimental arms. The control group was made up of 74 lending groups which met monthly to make loan payments. The treatment group was made up of 74 lending groups which met weekly to make loan payments. Data collection consisted of a pre-disbursement baseline survey, an endline survey collected shortly after the loan cycle, and monthly surveys collected monthly at group meetings.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in STATA
Randomization unit
In the first intervention, randomization was by lending groups of 9-13 first-time borrowers. In the second intervention, randomization was by lending groups of 5 first-time and repeat borrowers.
Clusters
First intervention: 100 lending groups Second intervention: 148 lending groups
Observations
First intervention: 1028 borrowers Second intervention: 739 borrowers
Arms
First intervention: 38 lending groups in control; 30 lending groups in first treatment arm; 32 lending groups in second treatment arm Second intervention: 74 lending groups in control; 74 lending groups in treatment
Primary outcomes
In the first intervention, key outcome variables are default rate in the subsequent loan cycle, short and long run social contact, and willingness to share risk with lending group members. In the second intervention, key outcome variables are a group social contact variable and a pairwise social contact variable.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Feigenberg, Benjamin, Erica Field, Rohini Pande, Natalia Rigol, and Shayak Sarkar. 2014. "Do Group Dynamics Influence Social Capital Gains Among Microfinance Clients? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Urban India.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Forthcoming. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pam.21790/abstract
  2. Feigenberg, Benjamin, Erica Field, and Rohini Pande. 2013. "The Economic Returns to Social Interaction: Experimental Evidence from Microfinance." Review of Economic Studies 80(4): 1459–1483. http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/content/80/4/1459.abstract

Cited by

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Keywords