Merit and Job Allocation
How to cite
Bhattacharya, Puja; Rampal, Jeevant. 2025. "Merit and Job Allocation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016034. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16034-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Different jobs usually require different skill sets. Hence, certain jobs are better performed by some than by others. A popular notion considers selecting workers for jobs based on individual merit – the ‘meritocratic’ principle – to be fair and efficient. However, in situations where multiple people need to be assigned to different jobs, assigning an individual who is the best available for a job may not always maximize productivity. We focus on a setting where two workers need to be assigned across two jobs. We show that when one of the workers is better at both the jobs, there arises a tension between a desert claim and an efficiency claim for justifying why an individual may merit a certain job. We conduct online experiments that test for and quantify whether individuals have such desert-based distributive preferences.
Intervention
We implement a primary elicitation using a 'spectator' design where "Spectators" are asked to assign two jobs between two anonymous "Workers". Spectators and Workers are participants recruited using an online survey platform (Prolific or similar). The jobs are selected to resemble familiar activities for workers on online platforms. Spectators are presented with a measure of 'skills' of the the two Workers on the two jobs. They observe the skills and choose a job-assignment for the pair of workers. A job assignment is a one-to-one matching of a worker to a job.
Experimental design
Spectators are matched to a pair of workers and are informed about the two jobs the workers will complete, for how long, and the piece-rate for completing individual tasks on the jobs. In addition, the spectators are informed about the individual performance of the two workers from a preliminary survey where the workers worked on the two jobs. The spectator observes a performance profile and decides which worker will be assigned to which job in the future. The spectator is told that within a month of them completing the survey, the workers will be invited back to work on the assigned job.
The experiment presents the spectators with different performance profiles to tease apart preference for 'desert-based' and 'efficiency-based' considerations behind job-assignment decisions.
Design details
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