An Experimental Analysis of Intensity-Based Emissions Trading Schemes
How to cite
Shen, Peiyao; Friesen, Lana; MacKenzie, Ian. 2025. "An Experimental Analysis of Intensity-Based Emissions Trading Schemes." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016017. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16017-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Emissions trading schemes (ETS) are widely implemented to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, including the long-running European Union ETS and the U.S. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. These almost exclusively employ a standard cap-and-trade scheme where the quantity of available pollution permits (i.e., allowable pollution) is fixed and predetermined. In contrast, an alternative approach, such as an intensity-based ETS, only fixes the required emissions intensity or rate (i.e., emissions per unit of output produced) rather than total emissions, is gaining popularity. Such an approach has been adopted in China's national ETS and Australia’s Safeguard Mechanism reforms. In this study, we aim to investigate the theoretical foundation and behavioural implications of the intensity-based ETS compared to the traditional cap-and-trade scheme. Through lab experiments, we will theoretically and experimentally compare the relative performance of intensity-based emissions trading schemes with the standard cap-and-trade scheme.
Experimental design
This study employs a laboratory experiment conducted in a standard university experimental economics lab, with participants recruited from a broader student population. Participants will be part of a single group of twelve participants for the duration of the experiment.
The main experimental task involves subjects making decisions about how many units of a fictitious good to produce. Each unit of product generates an amount of pollution, which must be either covered by holding a pollution permit or by abating the emission at a cost. Participants will receive an initial endowment of free permits and can trade them through a double auction market. Participants' earnings will be proportional to the profits they make from production and trading permits. Participants will have different types varying in their production and abatement costs.
We will consider two treatments: i) a standard cap-and-trade design with a fixed quantity of permits available, and ii) an equivalent intensity-based scheme, where emission allowances are tied to output decisions. Cost parameters and permit endowments will be chosen to maintain the maximum parallelism between the two treatments.
In addition, the experiment elicits participants' risk preferences and standard demographic information, which will be used as control variables in regression specifications to account for individual heterogeneity in behaviour.
Design details
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