Bundled Contract Farming and Microloans for Climate-Resilient Agricultural Production in Egypt

How to cite

Magruder, Jeremy; El-Shal, Amira; Brar, Rajdev. 2026. "Bundled Contract Farming and Microloans for Climate-Resilient Agricultural Production in Egypt." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016013. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16013-2.0

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Jeremy Magruder* , Amira El-Shal , Rajdev Brar

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016013
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16013-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-01-17 – 2028-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16013

Abstract

This randomized evaluation investigates the impact of a bundled contract-farming model on smallholder farmers’ productivity and climate resilience in Upper Egypt. Farmers in this region face acute exposure to climate risks, particularly extreme heat and limited irrigation, and are often trapped in a cycle of low investment and poor market access. This intervention offers credit to finance climate-resilient inputs for cash crops, coupled with guaranteed contracts and extension services.

We randomly assign farmers to one of four groups: (1) offer credit only, (2) offer credit with a recommendation to participate in contract farming and extension services, (3) offer credit conditional on uptake of contract farming and extension services, and (4) control group with no intervention. This design allows us to separate the effects of access to credit from the effects of the bundled contract and extension services.

We will evaluate the impact on agricultural productivity and profits, adoption of climate resilient practices, and participation in higher-value agricultural markets. By enabling farmers to invest in quality-enhancing practices and facilitating reliable market access, this intervention presents a potential pathway to break the cycle of low investment and inefficiency that traps smallholder farmers in persistent poverty.

In addition, we evaluate the differential selection of farmers into contract farming under both treatments where contracting is optional to receive the loan and where it is conditional on receiving the loan, examining the characteristics and outcomes of farmers who opt into contract farming when it is recommended [T2] versus when it is required [T3]. We plan to compare the performance of farmers who select into contract farming without loan conditionality versus those who select in only when obligated to receive the loan.

Intervention

The intervention combines three components: credit, extension services, and contract farming. We test whether credit products aligned with agricultural seasonality improve uptake and enable investment in adaptive technologies. Extension services, delivered via in-field agronomists and ICT tools, seeks to equip farmers with timely, actionable guidance for managing climate variability, an area with limited existing evidence. Contract farming improves farmers’ market access and supports quality certification, allowing farmers to obtain better prices for higher-quality products. This mechanism aims to address price distortions that otherwise disincentivize investment in quality-enhancing practices.

Experimental design

Treatment 1: Farmers will be offered credit only

Treatment 2: Farmers will be offered credit, along with a recommendation for contract farming and extension

Treatment 3: Farmers will be offered credit, conditional on them taking up contract farming and extension

Control: No intervention

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by random number generator on computer Randomization will be stratified by governorate, survey round, and whether the cluster-level share of tenant farmers is above the median across all clusters.
Randomization unit
Randomization unit is the farmer cluster, where one cluster consists of 10-12 farmers.
Clusters
226 clusters of farmers
Observations
2,268 farmers
Arms
We plan to have 567 farmers per arm
Primary outcomes
1) Take-up of treatment- credit from MFI, discussions with extension agents, enrollment in contract farming 2) Knowledge and adoption of climate-smart and commercial inputs and practices 3) Agricultural productivity, farm profits, and household income
Secondary outcomes
1) Welfare indicators (mental health, perceived improvements in quality of life) 2) Food security (FIES) 3) Soil degradation, including soil salinity (measured via soil tests by enumerators through a simple technique and soil moisture (measured by enumerators conducting a “squeeze test”) 4) Irrigation water use (measured using various methods, including number of hours of using irrigated water) 5) Strategies adopted to adapt to climate-related events 6) Sensitivities of farm outcomes to climate-related events 7) Loan repayment rates 8) Selection into contract farming, including differences in selection with and without loan conditionality. We plan on evaluating covariates that predict selection in each case, and also examining differences in treatment effects which may be attributable to selection.

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Keywords