Bundled Contract Farming and Microloans for Climate-Resilient Agricultural Production in Egypt
How to cite
Magruder, Jeremy; El-Shal, Amira; Brar, Rajdev. 2026. "Bundled Contract Farming and Microloans for Climate-Resilient Agricultural Production in Egypt." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016013. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16013-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This randomized evaluation investigates the impact of a bundled contract-farming model on smallholder farmers’ productivity and climate resilience in Upper Egypt. Farmers in this region face acute exposure to climate risks, particularly extreme heat and limited irrigation, and are often trapped in a cycle of low investment and poor market access. This intervention offers credit to finance climate-resilient inputs for cash crops, coupled with guaranteed contracts and extension services.
We randomly assign farmers to one of four groups: (1) offer credit only, (2) offer credit with a recommendation to participate in contract farming and extension services, (3) offer credit conditional on uptake of contract farming and extension services, and (4) control group with no intervention. This design allows us to separate the effects of access to credit from the effects of the bundled contract and extension services.
We will evaluate the impact on agricultural productivity and profits, adoption of climate resilient practices, and participation in higher-value agricultural markets. By enabling farmers to invest in quality-enhancing practices and facilitating reliable market access, this intervention presents a potential pathway to break the cycle of low investment and inefficiency that traps smallholder farmers in persistent poverty.
In addition, we evaluate the differential selection of farmers into contract farming under both treatments where contracting is optional to receive the loan and where it is conditional on receiving the loan, examining the characteristics and outcomes of farmers who opt into contract farming when it is recommended [T2] versus when it is required [T3]. We plan to compare the performance of farmers who select into contract farming without loan conditionality versus those who select in only when obligated to receive the loan.
Intervention
The intervention combines three components: credit, extension services, and contract farming. We test whether credit products aligned with agricultural seasonality improve uptake and enable investment in adaptive technologies. Extension services, delivered via in-field agronomists and ICT tools, seeks to equip farmers with timely, actionable guidance for managing climate variability, an area with limited existing evidence. Contract farming improves farmers’ market access and supports quality certification, allowing farmers to obtain better prices for higher-quality products. This mechanism aims to address price distortions that otherwise disincentivize investment in quality-enhancing practices.
Experimental design
Treatment 1: Farmers will be offered credit only
Treatment 2: Farmers will be offered credit, along with a recommendation for contract farming and extension
Treatment 3: Farmers will be offered credit, conditional on them taking up contract farming and extension
Control: No intervention
Design details
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