Solar demand with credit
How to cite
Zhang, Jiayue; Shu, Yunyu. 2025. "Solar demand with credit." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015893. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15893-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project studies the impact of embedding partial refund options in credit purchase contracts for productive assets, which provide a partial guarantee in case of uncertainty in the usefulness of the product and uncertainty in income. In the experiment, we focus on credit purchases of solar lights by small business owners in Ghana, and compare traditional down payment or repayment subsidy schemes to a contract that offers a partial refund to repayment-subsidized participants, with an equivalent subsidy amount in expectation. The embedded option insures against product and income uncertainty, attracting creditworthy consumers who value the insurance against adverse events, while screening out the consumers with high default risk that would otherwise select into adoption under a traditional down payment subsidy scheme.
Intervention
The intervention is an implicit subsidy in the prevailing market contract to purchase solar lights on credit, embedded in a willingness-to-pay elicitation procedure. Participants will be invited to make a series of discrete choices over credit contracts with different down payment and repayment amounts for the same solar product. One of their choices will be randomly selected and implemented in the end.
Experimental design
Respondents are randomized into four treatment groups facing different subsidies in the randomly selected implementable choice menu. Denote the market contract as (D, P) where D is the amount of down payment and P is the amount of repayment, and the subsidy amount as S for down payment and f(S) as the equivalent subsidy for repayment in the first 4 weeks. Respondents will choose between either of the two contracts shown or none of the two.
Control group: (D, P) versus (D+x, P+y), where x and y are randomly drawn small positive numbers.
Down payment subsidy group: (D, P) versus (D-S, P).
Repayment subsidy group: (D, P) versus (D, P-f(S)).
Embedded option group: (D, P) verus (D, P-f(S)), together with an option to return the product and receive the remaining subsidy
Design details
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