Mutual agreement and procedural fairness

How to cite

Oechssler, Jörg; Sengupta, Arjun; Trautmann, Stefan; Vanberg, Christoph. 2025. "Mutual agreement and procedural fairness." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015885. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15885-4.0

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Jörg Oechssler* , Arjun Sengupta , Stefan Trautmann , Christoph Vanberg

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015885
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15885-4.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2025-04-29 – 2025-11-30
Countries
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15885

Abstract

Economists have discussed different perspectives on ”procedural fairness”. Examples of ”fair” procedures include unbiased random processes (Machina’s mom) and symmetric games [Sugden and Wang, 2020]. We want to add the idea that a procedure (random process or game) will be considered more ”fair”, and the outcomes it generates more ”acceptable”, if the participants have unanimously agreed to it. That is, even a biased lottery or an asymmetric game may be regarded as ”fair” if it was agreed to even by the disadvantaged party.

Intervention

There are 7 treatments:
1) CONTROL: Subjects are randomly allocated to the biased or the unbiased spin.
2) MUTUAL: Both subjects in a pair have to agree to choose the biased spin. If one of them refuses, they both play the unbiased spin.

3) AGREEMENT: Sames as mutual except that subjects in a pair have to explicitely state that they agree to choose the biased spin.

4) Control0:
5) AGREEMENT0

6) AGR_Observe_R1
7) IMP-Observe_R1

Experimental design

Experimental Design Details
Our proposed experiment will run on the online platform Prolific using their subject pool, recruiting subjects from the UK.
After reading the instructions and completing control questions, each subject is assigned a color, either Red or Blue. Subjects know their color when the next steps happen.
Each subject is then either randomly assigned (treatment Control) or chooses (treatment Mutual) one of two options: (1) Play an individual lottery giving 3 pounds with probability 1/4 and 0 pounds else, or (2) playing a paired lottery with another participant of the opposite color. In the paired lottery, there is a 3/4 chance that the blue player earns 10 pounds and the red player zero, and a 1/4 chance that the red player earns 10 pounds and the blue player zero. In treatment Mutual, subjects who choose the paired lottery are subsequently matched to another subject who also chose this and is of the opposite color.
After the outcome of the paired lottery is determined, each subject in the pair can choose to accept or reject the outcome. If both accept, the payoffs from the lottery are paid. If either subject in a pair rejects, both are paid 1 pound instead.

UPDATED Preregistration:

After running treatments Control and Mutual we found no significant differences for the measures described in the preregistration from April 30, 2025.
Therefore, we decided to run a modified version of treatment Mutual, Agreement, which is identical in sample size and game form. The only difference is that subjects have to agree more explicitely that they want to play Spin the Wheel Version 2, e.g. by a pop-up windows that says: “I agree to play Version 2”.

2nd update:

After running treatment Agreement as preregistered on July 17, 2025, we again found no significant differences for the measures described in the preregistration.
We therefore decided to run another two treatments, Control0 and Agreement0, which differ from Control and Agreement, respectively, by what happens after the paired lottery is determined and at least one player rejects the outcome: rather than both receiving 1 pound, they receive 0 pound in the new treatments. This eliminates selfish reasons for rejecting an outcome and should make the power of the agreement stronger.

3rd update:
After running treatment Agreement as preregistered on July 30, 2025, we again found no significant differences for the measures described in the preregistration.
We therefore decided to run another two treatments, AGR_Observe_R1 and IMP_Observe_R1, which differ from Control (IMP_R1) and Agreement (AGR_R1), respectively, by what happens after the paired lottery is determined. In the new treatments, the subjects cannot reject the outcome of the biased wheel (Mutual). Rather, there is a third party, a subject who observes the outcome and who has the option of rejecting the outcome. In this case, both subjects in the pair receive 1 pound.
Observers get a fixed payment of 2 pounds.
Number of observations: in all other treatments so far we were aiming for 250 observations per treatment, assuming 80% would choose the biased wheel (Mutual) and 75% of those would get zero payoff. This yields 150 observations if interest.
Thus, we also aim for 150 observations of observers for the case that the red player gets a payoff of zero for both treatments AGR_Observe_R1 and IMP_Observe_R1.
We recruit 10 observers for the case that the blue player gets a payoff of zero for both treatments AGR_Observe_R1 and IMP_Observe_R1.
Since we are not interested in the behavior of the two players in the pair, we just recruit 10 pairs for each treatment that choose to play the the biased wheel (Mutual). We tell observers that their decision affect the prior participants’ payments only if it is randomly chosen.

Design details

Randomization method
Done by Prolific
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
500 pairs. This is under the assumption that 80% of pairs choose the paired lottery in Mutual. In case this percentage is substantially lower, we would need to increase the number of pairs in Mutual. Update: plus 250 for new treatment AGREEMENT 2nd Update: plus 500 for new treatments CONTROL0 and AGREEMENT0 3rd Update: Number of observations: in all other treatments so far we were aiming for 250 observations per treatment, assuming 80% would choose the biased wheel (Mutual) and 75% of those would get zero payoff. This yields 150 observations if interest. Thus, we also aim for 150 observations of observers for the case that the red player gets a payoff of zero for both treatments AGR_Observe_R1 and IMP_Observe_R1. We recruit 10 observers for the case that the blue player gets a payoff of zero for both treatments AGR_Observe_R1 and IMP_Observe_R1.
Observations
500 pairs + 250 pairs + 500 pairs + 150 observers
Arms
250 pairs per treatment
Primary outcomes
Rejection rates of red (disadvantaged) players (when getting the low payoff in the pair) after paired spin
Secondary outcomes
Other rejection rates (i.e. rejection rates when receiving the higher payoff and rejection rates when individual lottery is chosen) Unincentivized fairness assessments of the various situations

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Keywords