Market Unraveling and Quality Control in Agriculture
How to cite
Kelley, Erin; Emerick, Kyle; Lane, Gregory; Gimode, Davis; Dar, Manzoor. 2025. "Market Unraveling and Quality Control in Agriculture." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015865. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15865-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Recent evidence indicates that enhancing agricultural productivity is crucial for re- ducing poverty and fostering GDP growth. While various technologies exist to achieve this goal, international institutions stress the importance of investing in new crop varieties. These varieties can deliver higher yields, withstand variable climates, and enable farmers to diversify their crop portfolio. These features become increasingly important in the face of climate change, which is hampering agricultural productivity in low-income countries. If farmers expand their crop portfolio with higher-yielding, climate-resilient crops, they can better endure climate shocks and maintain higher productivity. But insufficient production of high-quality seeds could limit farm-level adoption of new seed varieties. We aim to test two interventions that encourage farm- ers to multiply quality seeds of improved crop varieties. These methods involve price incentives (offering higher prices to motivate growers) and DNA verification technology (using genotyping to verify genetic purity, a requirement for purchase by seed compa- nies). These approaches could be cost-effective and straightforward for governments, institutions, and private seed companies to implement.
Intervention
We ask a simple research question: do price incentives, cheap DNA verification technology, or both, reduce information asymmetries at the very earliest stage of the agricultural value chain? Determining which of these tools matters most could stimulate growth in seed markets for new varieties, which will help farmers adopt high-value crops and diversify their income streams. These outcomes are crucial for farmers to achieve, as the extreme weather conditions they face due to climate change are more regularly threatening their crop yields and productivity. Moreover, by ensuring that high-quality seeds are produced, more farmers may be willing to invest in them and successfully achieve higher yields through proper management.
Experimental design
We will explore the use of two possible levers to improve seed quantity and quality: higher prices (incentives to growers) and DNA testing. These two interventions have the potential to deal with problems of moral hazard and adverse selection they may be causing this market to unravel. Higher incentives may be necessary to offset the costs growers incur when multiplying seed and to attract higher-quality producers back into the market, helping to mitigate problems of adverse selection in these markets. However, even high-quality growers may decide not to bear the costs of producing pure seeds if there is little risk that inspectors will reject their output. In this case, implementing DNA testing may be necessary to ensure compliance with best practices and overcome problems of moral hazard.
To formally test which strategies are most effective at improving the quality of seeds that growers supply, we will run an RCT across 408 villages with 4 farmers in each village. Each village will be assigned to one of three treatment arms and a control group:
1. Control - Will receive a small incentive if they follow a simple set of best practices for producing groudnut.
2. Incentive - Will receive a large incentive if they follow a simple set of best practices for producing groudnut.
3. DNA testing - Will receive a small incentive if the DNA verification confirms that the seeds are genetically pure
4. DNA testing + Incentive - Will receive a large incentive if the DNA verification confirms that the seeds are genetically pure
Design details
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