Competition for Transparency
How to cite
Pizatella-Haswell, Rachel; Annan, Francis; Gupta, Apoorv. 2025. "Competition for Transparency." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015861. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15861-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
A large body of economics research has examined the role of price transparency, evaluating a range of policies implemented across different countries and markets. Evidence suggests that more transparent markets can benefit both customers and agents by disciplining firms’ behavior, increase trust among counterparties, and generally improving market efficiency.
This raises a natural question: if transparency can benefit consumers, and to some extent firms, why don’t market forces alone lead agents to be more transparent? Several policy tools have been proposed to address this gap — including audits (Naritomi 2019), disrupting collusive norms (Banerjee, Frischer, Karlan, Lowe, and Roth 2023), promoting competition (Bergquist and Dirnstein 2020), and increasing reputational costs for opaque behavior (Annan 2024) — with the goal of shifting the market from a low-transparency equilibrium to a more transparent one. Lack of transparency is especially relevant, if not the defining feature, in the market for digital financial services (DFS) in developing countries. In these markets consumers often face hidden fees and complex pricing. Mobile money, in particular, is marked by shrouded attributes, opaque pricing, and low financial literacy, making it an ideal setting to study transparency-enhancing interventions.
This study seeks to understand how to incentivize mobile money agents to share information with customers through displaying official MTN mobile money tariffs. We test whether financial incentives, competition, or reputational motivations increase agents’ willingness to engage in transparent practices, using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) across 175 rural communities across Ghana. The project includes three treatments designed to foster competition for transparency among mobile money agents in eastern Ghana. Agents in the treatment arms receive tariff posters that accurately display transaction fees. Among those offered the posters, we test three types of incentives to actually display them: (1) financial rewards, (2) competitive pressure from neighboring agents, and (3) reputational incentives from customer feedback.
Intervention
The intervention aims to incentivize tariff posting at mobile money agent locations through offering entrance into a lottery worth 200 GHS ($17 USD). Prominently displaying official mobile money tariffs at agent locations alerts customers to the correct amount they should be charging, creating a more transparent market. The intervention will be implemented in two stages. Stage one includes offering mobile money agents MTN tariff posters without incentives for posting
Stage 1
The first stage focuses purely on transparency, so the team will offer two treatments:
Treatment 1: The team will work with MTN to make tariff posters available to agents in select locations. MTN will notify these agents that they can pick up tariff posters at designated locations, likely near where agents collect e-float.
Pure control: The study will maintain a pure control group where agents are not offered the tariff poster.
Stage two includes incentivizing agents to post tariffs and includes three treatment arms: financial reward for posting tariffs, competition with other agents who post tariffs and customers who monitor agents' tariff posting.
Stage 2
Among the agents offered the tariff poster in stage one, we will offer incentives to mobile money agents and mobile money customers. Agents are entered into the lottery if they post information about official mobile money tariffs. Customers are entered into the lottery if they report on agents who fail to post information about official mobile money tariffs. The intervention includes three treatment arms:
Treatment 1: Treatment one invites 1 agent to participate in a lottery for 5 months. We select the agent randomly after the census of all agents in the market. For the 1 agent included in the lottery, auditors confirm that the agent is eligible for the lottery. If the agent posts tariffs he/she automatically wins the lottery. We select 1 lottery winner per market per month. The selected agent knows they are the only one in their area being treated and that they are guaranteed to win if compliant.
Treatment 2: Treatment two invites all agents to participate in a lottery for 5 months. Auditors confirm that agents are eligible for the lottery through random mystery shopping visits over the course of the study. We select 1 winner per market per month from the pool of eligible agents. We select 1 lottery winner per market per month. Agents know that other agents in the community are also eligible, and that only one will be selected per month.
Treatment 3: Treatment three invites both agents and customers to participate in a lottery for 5 months. Auditors confirm that agents are eligible for the lottery through random mystery shopping visits over the course of the study. Customers can enter the survey by sharing photos of mobile money agent locations and mobile money transaction receipts (if available). We select 1 winner per market per month from the pool of eligible agents and customers. We select 1 agent winner per market per month and 1 customer winner per market per month. Agents know that other agents in the community are also eligible, and that only one will be selected per month. The customer contest was described to agents as part of the intervention, meaning agents know that customers would also be monitoring them.
Tariff Control: This group will have been offered the tariff poster but will not be offered any incentives for posting.
Experimental design
To understand the mechanisms through which agents are incentivized to post mobile money tariffs, we compare tariff posting across treatment arms who received the tariff poster. Comparing tariff posting in treatment 1 to control explains the impact of financial incentives on tariff posting. We can measure the impact of competition incentives by testing the difference between treatment 2 and control to that between treatment 1 and control. Similarly, we can measure the impact of reputational incentives by testing the difference between treatment 3 and control to treatment 2 and control and treatment 1 and control.
To assess the downstream effects of tariff posting on quality of service and business outcomes, we compare agents in treatments who were incentivized to post tariffs to agents in the pure control and to agents who were not incentivized to post. We will pool the treatment arms together and examine the downstream impacts across treatment arms separately.
Design details
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