Negotiating Informality: Bargaining Practices and Preferences of Domestic Workers
How to cite
Solmone, Irene; Hipola, Belén. 2025. "Negotiating Informality: Bargaining Practices and Preferences of Domestic Workers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015856. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15856-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
How do workers in markets with high irregularity rates value formality? We aim to shed light o this question by implementing a conjoint experiment design among domestic workers in Milan. By randomizing job attributes across hypothetical job offers, including having a contract or not, we will elicit worker’s willingness to pay for (in)formality. To explore how access to labor market information shapes bargaining behavior, we also introduce an information treatment: respondents receive data on the sector's average wage and the minimum wage set by the relevant collective bargaining agreement. We then estimate the effect of this information on workers’ wage expectations and perceived bargaining power. This study contributes to the literature on informal labor markets and offers broader insights into job search behavior and wage negotiation dynamics.
Intervention
We will carry out an information treatment in the survey where we provide workers with information on
both:
• The average wage in the sector in Northern Italy using data from the Labour Force Survey covering
both formal and informal work.
• Minimum wage brackets from the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CCNL Lavoro Domestico
2024).
Experimental design
We implement a two-part experimental design embedded in a survey of domestic workers in Milan.
First, we use a conjoint experiment to elicit preferences over job attributes by presenting respondents with randomized pairs of hypothetical job offers that vary along three key dimensions: net hourly wage, contract status (full, partial, or no formal contract), and commuting time. Each respondent is shown four such pairs and asked to both choose between the two offers and rate each one individually on a Likert scale. This design enables estimation of the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of each attribute on job choice.
We will consider two subpopulations within our sample, each receiving the same experimental design: elder care ("badanti") and cleaners. If an individual is employed as both, he or she will be classified by the job that takes up the most hours. However, the conjoint experiment will be slightly different, according to the type of work carried out: individuals that work as "badante" (elder care) will choose between two badante jobs, while individuals that work as cleaners will choose between two cleaning jobs. The badante and cleaning jobs will have some attributes in common (presence of a contract, commuting time, wage), but will also differ in some other attributes that are more job-specific (e.g. for badante, gender of the person cared for).
Second, we introduce an information treatment, randomly assigning a subset of respondents to receive accurate information about average wages in the sector and the minimum wage brackets outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. We then assess the impact of this information on respondents’ expectations about their wage bargaining potential with current or future employers. Again, information will differ slightly, according to the individual's main occupation.
Design details
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