Subject Characteristics and Play of Repeated Games: Further Experiments
How to cite
Duffy, John; Hopkins, Ed; Kornienko, Tatiana. 2025. "Subject Characteristics and Play of Repeated Games: Further Experiments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015844. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15844-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This is a followup study to a previously registered study, AEARCTR-0006318, Subject Characteristics and Play of Repeated Games
We study play in a series of indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games that vary in the probability that the game continues from one period to the next. Subjects play against a known, programmed grim trigger strategy, so that it is possible that they decide how to play each indefinitely repeated game based on expected earnings from their action choices.
In these further sessions, we change the probability of continuation less frequently, only after four plays of an indefinitely repeated game under the same continuation probability to give participants more experience with a given continuation probability.
We also elicit priors as to how frequently across the various games they face that they will choose the cooperative or defect option in the first round of each new repeated game. We are particularly interested in whether these measures correlate with play in the repeated game.
At the end of the study we now collect an incentivized measure of subjects' risk aversion. As in our earlier study we collect measures of subjects’ risk, time and social preferences as measures of their cognitive abilities and their demographic information
Intervention
We study how subjects play a series of indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games that vary in the probability that the game continues from one period to the next. Subjects play against a known, programmed grim trigger strategy, so that it is possible that they decide how to play each indefinitely repeated game based on expected earnings from their action choices. We elciit beliefs as to how frequently across the various games they will face that they will choose the cooperative or defect option in the first round of each new repeated game. We also collect measures of subjects’ risk, time and social preferences and their cognitive abiliities. We are particularly interested in whether these measures correlate with play in the repeated game.
Experimental design
We vary the continuation probability across a sequence of repeated games. The continuation probability changes after every four repeated games. The continuation probability and the strategy of the robot grim player are always known to subjects when making their decisions. Treatments involve (1) different values for the continuation probabilities as well as (2) different orderings of the continuation probabilities within a session, in a between subjects desgin. We have two different treatments for the set of continuation values and two different orderings of each set of continuation values, four treatments in total.
Design details
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