Group versus Individual Liability: Short and Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups
How to cite
Karlan, Dean; Development, Xavier Giné World Bank Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of. 2016. "Group versus Individual Liability: Short and Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001583. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1583-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in short-run or long-run default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas.
Intervention
The researchers evaluated two randomized control trials.
In the first RCT, half of the Green Bank of Caraga's existing lending centers were randomized into the treatment group. Randomization was stratified by the bank's eleven credit officers. Treatment was implemented in three waves over nine months. In the treatment group, lending centers switched from group liability to individual liability and the savings rules changed. That is, members were no longer held liable for other members' defaults, and mandatory savings were deposited entirely into individual accounts rather than split between individual, group, and center accounts. The control group maintained group liability and group saving requirements
In the second RCT, 124 candidate barangays were randomly selected for possible lending center expansion . Out of these, the bank identified and opened lending centers in 68 barangays deemed feasible by bank officers. These 68 lending centers were then randomly assigned to one of three lending products: 1) group-liability, 2) individual-liability with no group savings requirement, and 3) phased-in individual liability (group-liability for the first loan cycle, individual liability on the following after successful repayment). No group savings were required for any of the three lending schemes.
Experimental design
In the first RCT, all of the Green Bank's 169 existing lending centers on the island of Leyte were randomly selected into control and treatment groups. The control group would continue receiving the bank's prior Grameen-style, group-liability lending model. Lending centers were made up of 15-30 entrepreneurial women, further divided into subgroups of five. At mandatory weekly meetings individuals made a repayment, subgroups were responsible to cover delinquencies, and lending center was responsible if a subgroup defaulted. Weekly deposits into individual, subgroup, and center savings accounts was mandatory. The treatment group were to switch to an individual-liability lending model. Borrowers were no longer liable if other borrowers were late or defaulted on their loan. Borrowers still met weekly for repayment and mandatory savings deposit amounts were unchanged, but all deposits were made into individual accounts. Conversion of the treatment group occurred in three waves over nine months. Administrative data was collected from prior, during, and after the intervention from the bank. A post-experiment activity survey of credit officers and three surveys of borrowers were collected as well.
In the second RCT, new areas for possible expansion of the bank's operations were identified. 124 villages, or barangays, were randomly selected. Of the 124, 68 barangays were selected as feasible for expansion. The selection criteria for the 68 chosen barangays was the same as the criteria for prior areas were lending centers had been established. The 68 new lending centers were randomly selected to offer one of three lending products: 1) group-liability loans, 2) individual-liability loans, and 3) phased-in individual-liability loans (group-liability for the first loan, individual-liability on subsequent loans on successful repayment). Administrative data from the bank was collected for the duration of the intervention in addition to the activity survey of credit officers and business census and social network surveys of borrowers.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Giné, Xavier and Karlan, Dean S. (2014), 'Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups', Journal of Development Economics, 107, 65-83. http://karlan.yale.edu/sites/default/files/1-s2.0-s030438781300165x-main.pdf
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